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Abstract
The Norwegian oil and gas industry has a highly collaborative, but at the same highly
competitive nature. Most of the daily oil and gas production takes place on the Norwegian
continental shelf in the North Sea. The production facilities are expensive to develop and
maintain, and it is therefore necessary to take advantage of new and innovative solutions;
both above and beneath the sea surface. Close collaboration between the operators and
the contractors1 is needed. At the same time these companies can be strict competitors
in other projects. Information security is thus essential; only information relevant for a
given collaboration should be available to the involved parties.
Federated identity management (FIM) is a concept that allows cooperation on technolo-
gies, processes and policies for identity management, as well as sharing of identity data
across organizational boundaries and across security domains. Many current information
security challenges within the industry are related to access control and identity man-
agement. The goal of this PhD project has been to analyze companies involved in the
Norwegian oil and gas production in order to explore their perceived beneﬁts, challenges
and other security risks related to adoption of FIM.
In order to meet our research goal we have based our research on three research methods:
a design science approach, systematic literature reviews, and a case study. Empirical
evidence related to the oil and gas industry and its perception of FIM is mainly collected
through the case study, using semi-structured interviews to collect data.
First, our research shows that a focus on security is needed throughout the whole software
development lifecycle when developing identity management solutions. It is especially
important to protect the identity assertion. Federated identity management is more than
just technology. Collaborators within the federation must agree on common rules and
security policies for all phases of the identity management lifecycle.
Second, the federated identity research community should spend more effort on empir-
ical research. Great initiatives exist to move the technology into academic perfection,
however, little empirical evidence exists to document real world expectations and needs.
Third, this research has listed the beneﬁts and challenges of FIM from an academic per-
spective and from an industry perspective. We have also documented many of the chal-
lenges the industry is faced with today related to access control.
Our interviews with the industry practitioners show that some of the beneﬁts of FIM are
offset by their challenges. However, we believe that some forms of federated identity
management will be implemented in some form sooner or later. This research can be
used as input to tailor new identity management solutions to the Norwegian oil and gas
industry’s needs, it can be used to highlight the need for security in the software develop-
ment process, and it can be used to understand the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities
and threats related to adoption of federated identity management in the industry.
1including e.g. equipment vendors, oil service companies, engineering companies
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The oil and gas industry on the Norwegian continental shelf has migrated from the use of
closed, autonomous offshore production facilities to production facilities where offshore
(including subsea) and onshore facilities are highly interconnected. The use of modern
information and communication technology has facilitated this migration, and the con-
cept has been called integrated operations (IO). The new work and information ﬂows
improve information sharing, and facilitate collaboration among personnel e.g. from the
operator, the service companies and vendors [2]. Figure 1.1 gives an indication of the
collaborating actors in the IO environment. The new opportunities, however, also lead
to new challenges. Jaatun and his colleagues [40] explain that a migration from stand-
alone proprietary systems to commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems, combined with
increased connectivity between ofﬁce networks and supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion (SCADA) systems, increase the likelihood of security incidents.
Figure 1.1: Actors in the IO domain. Adapted from Tungland et al. [78]
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Information security is an important success factor for integrated operations, and new
means to achieve secure access to IT- and process control systems must be devised [2]. A
solid identity management foundation is essential to ensure that information is disclosed
only to authorized personnel (conﬁdentiality), that only authorized entities can modify or
delete information (integrity), and that information is available to authorized individuals
upon request (availability). Federated Identity Management (FIM) is a concept speciﬁ-
cally targeted at collaborative environments, and is a concept that allows cooperation on
processes, policies and technologies for identity management across company borders to
facilitate secure and seamless information sharing.The following goal was stated for the
this thesis:
This PhD project will analyse companies involved in close
inter-organisational collaboration in Integrated Operations
for the purpose of exploring the perceived beneﬁts, chal-
lenges and security risks related to adoption of federated
identity management in the Norwegian oil and gas industry.
1.2 Research Questions
FIM has gained popularity over the last few years. Governments around the world (also
in Norway) have deployed federated identity management services that can be used by
citizens to access digital government services. Online banks have taken advantage of the
FIM technology so that they can share, and beneﬁt from, a common IdM infrastructure.
Finally, there are several examples on the Internet, where the credentials issued by your
favourite social media site can be used to gain access to other digital online services. FIM
adoption, however, has been slower than expected [74] [55] [37], and it’s close to non-
existent within the Norwegian oil and gas industry.In order to gain a better understanding
of the industry’s perception of FIM we stated the following research questions:
RQ1 What are the main security challenges faced during development of secure identity
management solutions for a distributed service platform?
RQ2 What empirical evidence exists on the development and adoption of FIM in indus-
try?
RQ3 What are the beneﬁts and challenges related to FIM from the perspective of the
academic community and the industry, respectively?
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1.3 Research Context and Path
This thesis is ﬁnanced by the GoICT project1 funded by the Norwegian Research Council.
The early results, however, also draw upon the European Commission funded research
project MPOWER2.
The goal of the GoICT project was to create guidelines for development of high quality,
dependable software within the energy sector, and more speciﬁcally in the Norwegian oil
and gas industry. Critical components within this industry are increasingly more reliant
upon software components, which affect the risk associated with on-going operations.
The software dependability guidelines resulting from the project should allow develop-
ment of software with qualities related to ensuring business continuity, safety and secu-
rity, to keep risk at an acceptable level. This thesis contributes to the security aspect of
the GoICT project.
The aim of the MPOWER project was to develop a middleware platform to support im-
plementation of distributed services in an assisted living scenario. Smart home and sensor
technology were to be integrated with profession and institution-speciﬁc systems to allow
remote follow up of, and interaction with, elderly and people with cognitive disabili-
ties. Health scenarios are automatically subject to strict security requirements in regard to
conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability of sensitive personal data [49]. Identity manage-
ment, including user authentication, is a fundamental element to ensure fulﬁlment of the
security requirements in such a setting. Consequently, the project included development
of security services to handle the identity management. Due to usability requirements, a
solution to achieve single-sign-on was selected.
Although the goals of the two projects seem unrelated, many elements from a distributed
health service scenario and the oil and gas industry’s initiatives for integrated operations
are similar. The most important being:
• A number of actors are involved
• Collaboration and information sharing among the different actors are key to success
• Both rely on distributed services
• Both scenarios imply strict security requirements to protect sensitive information
The MPOWER project was nearing its end while the PhD work started. Being responsible
for the security design of the healthcare platform, and given the similarities between the
two scenarios, the idea of developing a common IdM solution for the oil and gas industry’s
IO environment seemed compelling. The original plan of the PhD work was therefore to
reuse knowledge about IdM solutions as prerequisite for secure data exchange and single-
sign-on from the MPOWER project, and adapt it to a new industrial environment with a
1GoICT, grant 183235/S10 from the Norwegian Research Council
2MPOWER, Contract No. 034707, Speciﬁc Targeted Research or Innovation Project (STREP) within
the 6th Framework Programme
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Figure 1.2: Studies, papers and contributions
scientiﬁc approach to tailor the solution and its functionality to a new environment. In-
stead of protecting sensitive personal health data, the solution could be used to facilitate
secure seamless sharing of sensitive business information among the industry collabora-
tors on the Norwegian continental shelf. The idea of federated identity management ﬁt
very well into this approach, and was pursued during the PhD project.
Figure 1.2 shows the relations between the studies that have been carried out within the
scope of this thesis. It illustrates the progress that took place from the initial idea of hav-
ing a technical design science approach based on the artifact developed in the MPOWER
project (input to Study 1 in ﬁgure 1.2) to the end where a research approach based on an
empirical case study focused on the Norwegian oil and gas industry’s needs and expecta-
tions was followed (Study 2).
In Study 1, the design and the implementation of the IdM solution for the healthcare
platform was available for testing and use. Before starting the adaptation towards usage
in a new domain, however, we chose to do a security test of the solution. We wanted
to learn from "past mistakes" - if any. As we will see later in section 4.1 this study
identiﬁed several challenges with the existing solution; The implementation did not meet
the requirements. This led to Review 1.
Model driven development (MDD) is an approach where design models are automatically
translated to software code. Several initiatives have used an MDD approach to integrate
4
security in the design models, and as such claim to convert the design models to code with
inherent security properties. In Review 1 we therefore carried out a literature review to
learn from academics’ past experiences, and see if this approach could be used to avoid
some of the errors that had happened between the design and implementation that we
found in Study 1. Unfortunately, we did not ﬁnd empirical evidence to support claims that
secure MDD practices would lead to more secure code, and in our case a more secure IdM
solution. This approach was therefore not pursued further. The lack of empirical research
on the topic of MDD, however, motivated Review 2. Would there be empirical evidence
within another area of security research, namely research related to FIM adoption?
Close to the end of Review 1 we initiated Review 2 to learn more about the concepts of
federated identity management. The ideas of FIM are very much in line with the SSO-
inspired IdM approach taken in MPOWER. Academic literature was therefore studied to
build upon existing research during design of a new identity management solution for the
oil and gas industry. An important part of this study was to identify which beneﬁts and
challenges academics had identiﬁed during implementation of FIM solutions - again to
build on the strengths of past experiences, and to avoid already identiﬁed pitfalls. Through
this study we conﬁrmed that the idea of FIM would be suited in an IO scenario in the oil
and gas industry. However, again we found little empirical evidence related to actual
implementation and use of FIM solutions. This led to a change of direction in the work
towards this thesis and resulted in Study 2:
Instead of building a technical system that would have been built on good ideas and inten-
tions and probably tested and evaluated in a small scale academic laboratory environment,
we went out to the industry to catch real world empirical data as to what their expecta-
tions towards a FIM solution in a collaborative environment are. We wanted to learn more
about the current challenges the industry is faced with regarding secure information shar-
ing and identity management in a collaborative environment, and how they perceive the
beneﬁts and challenges of adopting FIM solutions. Is there a need for FIM at all, and is it
realistic that the industry at large will adopt a common solution to facilitate collaboration?
With lack of existing empirical evidence in academic FIM literature, this contribution rep-
resents something new to build upon when future FIM solutions are to be developed and
tailored to industry needs.
1.4 Selected Papers
Figure 1.2 shows the papers that resulted from the different studies. The list below sums
up the papers that were selected for inclusion in this thesis. The numbering follows the
ID given in the ﬁgure. Additionally, the ﬁgure refers to three secondary papers that are
related to Study 1 and Review 1. These provide background results and complementary
information to the primary papers. Their abstracts are found in Appendix B.
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1.4.1 Primary Papers
P1 Jostein Jensen, Åsmund Ahlmann Nyre: "SOA Security - an experience report", Proc.
The Norwegian Information Security Conference (NISK), 185-196, 2009
Reference ID in this thesis: [47]
P2 Jostein Jensen, Martin Gilje Jaatun: "Not Ready for Prime Time: A Survey on Security
in Model Driven Development", International Journal of Secure Software Engineer-
ing, 49-61, 2011
Reference ID in this thesis: [45]
P3 Jostein Jensen: "Beneﬁts of Federated Identity Management - A Survey from an Inte-
grated Operations Viewpoint", Availability, Reliability and Security for Business,
Enterprise and Health Information Systems, volume 6908 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, 1-12, 2011
Reference ID in this thesis: [42]
P4 Jostein Jensen: "Federated Identity Management Challenges", Proc. Seventh Inter-
national Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES ’12), 230-235,
2012
Reference ID in this thesis: [43]
P5 Jostein Jensen, Martin Gilje Jaatun: "Federated Identity Management - We Built It;
Why Won’t they Come?", IEEE Security & Privacy, 34-41, 2013
Reference ID in this thesis: [44]
P6 Jostein Jensen, Åsmund Ahlmann Nyre: "Federated Identity Management and Us-
age Control - Obstacles to Industry Adoption", Eigth International Conference on
Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES ’13), 2013
Reference ID in this thesis: [46]
P7 Jostein Jensen, "Identity Management Lifecycle - Exemplifying the need for Holistic
Identity Assurance Frameworks". Information and Communication Technology,
volume 7804 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 343 - 352. Springer,
2013
Reference ID in this thesis: [48]
1.4.2 Secondary Papers
SP1 Jostein Jensen, Inger Anne Tøndel, Martin Gilje Jaatun, Per Håkon Meland, and Her-
bjørn Andresen, "Reusable Security Requirements for Healthcare Applications".
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Fourth International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES
’2009), 2009
Reference ID in this thesis: [49]
SP2 Richard Sassoon, Martin Gilje Jaatun, Jostein Jensen, "The Road to Hell is Paved
with Good Intentions: A Story of (In)secure Software Development" Fifth Interna-
tional Conference on Availability, Reliability, and Security (ARES ’10), 2010.
Reference ID in this thesis: [66]
1.5 Contributions
Table 1.1 shows the key ﬁndings of this thesis, their relation to the research questions and
the papers where more details are found.
Table 1.1: Relations between key ﬁndings, research questions and papers
No Key ﬁnding RQ Paper
1 IdM security speciﬁcations alone do not guarantee secure applications. 1 P1, SP1,
SP2
2 Identity assertions must be properly protected. 1 P1
3 Secure identity management is more than secure technology. 1 P7
4 Little empirical evidence exists on the development and adoption of
federated identity management.
2 P2, P3, P4
5 Academics expect increased privacy, security and usability for end
users.
3 P3
6 Academics expect businesses to beneﬁt from reduced administrative
cost and complexity, improved data quality and security, and easier co-
operation.
3 P3
7 Academics expect technical challenges related to interoperability,
attribute synchronization and consistency, revocation and identity
provider discovery.
3 P4
8 Academics expect organizational challenges related to investment cost,
liability issues, identity assurance, security, knowledge and trust.
3 P4
9 Practitioners perceive that FIM will improve user administration and
usability, make collaboration more efﬁcient, reduce cost, facilitate audit
and lead to better protection.
3 P5
10 Practitioners expect trust issues, technological challenges, investment
cost and security challenges to be obstacles to adoption of FIM in in-
dustry, and there is a risk that they confuse identity management with
access management.
3 P5
11 Practitioners question whether there is sufﬁcient organizational maturity
to adopt new identity management solutions.
3 P5, P6
The PhD thesis provides a body of knowledge that gives insight into federated identity
management in general, and with a special focus on the Norwegian oil and gas industry.
Table 1.2 provides an overview of the target audience of this work, and how they can take
advantage of the results.
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Table 1.2: Who this PhD will be useful for, and how they can beneﬁt
Actors Beneﬁt
IT strategy planners
and solution archi-
tects
Understand strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and
threats of adopting identity federation technology in an
inter-organizational industry environment.
Researchers 1) Understand federated identity management in an indus-
trial domain, and focus research activities towards industry
needs.
2) Motivate further empirical studies on federated identity
management
Developers/product
manufacturers
Understand company needs and develop solutions that meet
requirements in a inter-organisational collaboration context
in industry.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents background in-
formation to the ﬁeld of digital identities and federated identity management. Chapter
3 provides a brief overview of the context of this research, i.e. the Norwegian oil and
gas industry, as well as an overview of the selected research approaches and the moti-
vation for their use. Chapter 4 presents the results sorted by the topics of each research
question. The content of this chapter is copied from, and sometimes a narrative of the
selected papers to improve the readability of the thesis. The most relevant results are in-
cluded, however, more details and complimentary information can be found in each paper.
Chapter 5 discuss the implications of the work, the limitations of the thesis results, and
provides some recommendations for future research on the topic. Chapter 6 concludes
the thesis. In Appendix A we have enclosed all the selected papers, while Appendix B
provides references and abstracts of each supporting paper.
Both the research community and industry practitioners are identiﬁed as target groups
of this thesis. Consequently, we provide details in the background section so that both
groups can gain sufﬁcient insight to understand our results and their implications.
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Chapter 2
Background
Identiﬁcation and authentication processes have always been important to hinder leakage
of resources to unauthorized entities, also prior to the IT-era; Bank employees should ver-
ify their customers’ ID-cards, such as driver’s license or passport, before money can be
withdrawn over the counter, pharmacy staff should verify their customers’ ID before they
deliver prescribed medications, and case workers should control the identity information
of the person in front of them before they continue discussing personal sensitive informa-
tion. These are standard procedures to make sure that the person asking for some informa-
tion or resource really is who he/she claims to be, in order to determine whether they are
authorized to get whatever they are requesting. There are many dangers to consider when
migrating from human-in-the-loop processes to modernized, fully digital online services.
One of the more important is related to the identiﬁcation and authentication process. How
can you trust that the person requesting access to some protected resources online really
is who he claims to be? What kind evidence do you need to be able to say: "I believe you
- here’s your sensitive data" to a person that you cannot see, do not know, and who can sit
anywhere in the world? This is where topics on digital identities (section 2.1) and identity
management (section 2.2) play a central role.
The essence of information security is to protect assets according to given requirements
for conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). Conﬁdentiality implies that informa-
tion should be disclosed only to authorized subjects. Integrity is ensured if only authorized
subjects are allowed to modify assets, and availability means that the asset should be ac-
cessible or usable to authorized subjects upon request. Since authorization decisions in
IT-environments are based on claimed digital identities, we argue that secure management
of digital identities is a fundamental prerequisite to ensure information security in every
computer environment.
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2.1 Digital Identity
Identity is a word, which is interpreted differently by different people, and depending on
the context in which it is used. The identity concept can for instance refer to 1) a collective
set of characteristics by which a thing is deﬁnitely recognizable, 2) the set of behavioral or
personal characteristics by which an individual is recognizable as a member of a group, 3)
the distinct personality of an individual, or 4) as an expression in mathematics1. The origin
of the word stems from the late 16th century with the original meaning ’quality of being
identical’2. With the last few decades’ digital evolution, the identity concept has also been
adopted by the information and communication technology community (now in the sense
digital identity), and also in this community with slight different deﬁnitions of the term.
In their ISO/IEC 24760-1 standard, the International Standardizations Organization (ISO)
deﬁnes identity as "information used to represent an entity in an ICT system" [11], while
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) deﬁnes identity as "Information about
an entity that is sufﬁcient to identify that entity in a particular context" [8]. In the strictest
sense, the latter deﬁnition limits the identity to the information that identiﬁes a particular
entity, whereas the ISO standard allows more descriptive information about the entity to
be included in the concept.
Hansen et al. [34] present a comprehensive view on digital identities, where the entity
term from the ISO and ITU deﬁnitions translates to human beings. They state that digital
identities can consist of one or more attributes, and that each attribute refers to personal
data or personal information about an individual. Personal information will be collected
and stored in digital registries in various situations throughout a person’s life; govern-
ments create and store birth certiﬁcates, health care systems store medical data, and edu-
cational institutions and companies will store personal attributes. Hansen et al. argue that
the total sum of all these attributes of personal information constitutes a person’s digital
identity (consistent with deﬁnition 1) above). The subset of identity attributes needed to
represent an individual in a speciﬁc situation is context dependent. They call these subsets
for partial identities, and say that an "individual typically appears under different partial
identities for work, other for leisure activities [...] or dealing with companies" (deﬁnition
2) above).
This research is focused on an industrial context, and on how professionals can access
resources in their working environment. In the context of this thesis we refer to identities
as digital information that represent a physical person in an ICT system, and with the clar-
iﬁcation of Bertino and Takahashi [23] on the building blocks of the digital identity; A
digital identity consists of three key elements: 1) an identiﬁer used to identify the owner
of the identity 2) attributes, which describe different characteristics of, or related to, the
identity owner 3) credentials which are evidence/data that is used by the identity owner
to establish conﬁdence that the person using the identity in the digital world corresponds
1http://www.thefreedictionary.com/identity
2http://oxforddictionaries.com/deﬁnition/english/identity
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to the claimed person3. This implies that a digital identity can be used identify the person
that requests a resource, that the identity claim can be veriﬁed through an authentica-
tion process involving the credentials, and that authorization decisions can be based on
an individuals’ identity attributes, such as the role attribute in an role-based access con-
trol (RBAC) regime, or the location and nationality in an attribute-based access control
(ABAC) regime.
2.2 Identity Management
One of the ﬁrst pieces of information a new employee is presented with when joining
a company is related to how the corporate computers, networks and services can be ac-
cessed. A username (identiﬁer) and temporary password (credential) is often delivered
in a sealed envelope. This information is then used to log into and access company re-
sources. Prior to the issuance of the credentials, the human resource or IT-department has
created a user account for this person, including identity attributes such as, name, address,
phone number, organizational role, and of course the mentioned username and password.
Most of the personally identiﬁable information that constitutes a digital identity (or user
account) is presented to the organization by the employee itself. Price [61] makes a point
of this and says that if the initial veriﬁcation of the user’s identity [and his attributes] is
ﬂawed, then the service provision is undermined. Since we argued that digital identities
are fundamental prerequisites to ensure information security in computer environments
we agree with Price that security must be considered in all activities associated with man-
agement of identities. Identity Management comprises the processes an organization must
have in place to create, use, update, and revoke digital identities, and the policies that exist
to govern each of these activities. The IdM lifecycle is illustrated in Figure 2.1, and also
presented by Bertino and Takahashi [23]. The rigor and quality of all steps of the IdM
process can vary substantially between different organizations, and this affects the level
of trust that can be associated with a digital identity. Dishonest individuals can exploit
weaknesses in any of the identity management lifecycle steps to gain unauthorized access
to resources, and as such threaten conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability of assets [26]
[44]. Insufﬁcient focus on identity management within an organization can also lead to
security incidents caused unintentionally by a company’s own employees [32].
2.2.1 Digital Identity Creation
The ﬁrst step of the identity management lifecycle is to create digital identities. In a busi-
ness case, identity attributes will be collected and registered, credentials will be deﬁned,
and ﬁnally delivered to the user during this process. The rigor in this phase can vary
from company to company. The creation phase may include identity prooﬁng practices
involving screening and vetting of users [11]. In contrast, many of the popular services on
3Thus a hybrid between the ISO and ITU deﬁnitions.
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Figure 2.1: Identity Management Lifecycle. Adapted from Bertino and Takahashi [23]
the Internet, such as the social media sites allow users to enter all necessary identity in-
formation without further veriﬁcation. Rigor in the identity creation process is of utmost
importance for systems that require a high to moderate security level, i.e., for systems
where there is a need to know that the physical person trying to access a system resource
correlates with the digital identity provided to the system. The creation process is the
foundation for all subsequent use of digital identities. If false or unveriﬁed data is entered
into the identity management system in this phase, then the system creates a situation in
which security is reduced [27].
2.2.2 Use of Digital Identities
Once a digital identity is created and issued, it is time to start using it in electronic trans-
actions. The most common use of digital identities is to use it to authenticate the users
by means of the identiﬁer and credentials (ref. section 2.1). The authentication process is
central in this respect, and includes two steps [3]:
• Identiﬁcation, which means that attributes, e.g. identity attributes, are presented to
the authentication service.
• Veriﬁcation, which means that evidence is created to be able to trust the binding
between the attribute and the entity it represents.
"Hi, my name is Jostein Jensen" is an everyday example of identiﬁcation, where I claim to
be this person. An example of veriﬁcation would be to continue the previous conversation
by saying: "and here is my passport that proves I am Jostein Jensen", whereby the receiver
takes a look at the presented passport and checks to see if there is a match between the
photo and the physical person, the claimed name with the name written in the passport,
and validity of the passport. The most common authentication example for IT-systems
today is the use of usernames and passwords. Users identify by saying: "My username is:
jostein.jensen" and "here is my secret password: Password123". Since the user and the
service are the only entities that know the password, the service can be conﬁdent that the
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person asking for access is the same person that the identity was created for.
In addition to user authentication (by means of the identiﬁer and credentials), the other
identity attributes in the digital identity can be used for various purposes. RBAC and
ABAC schemes can use attributes as input to the authorization decisions in access control
modules, and in other scenarios the identity attributes can be used to provide tailored con-
tent to the visiting user. In an e-commerce scenario, relevant identity attributes could be a
person’s name, shipping address, phone number and payment card data. Other attributes
would be more relevant in other contexts, such as gender and age on social media net-
works or organizational role (to determine authorization level) and social security number
in a professional context. Digital identities can be created for the purpose of use in one
system only, or on multiple services including options to provide single-sign-on.
2.2.3 Update Identity Attributes
Camp [27] divides identity attributes into three different categories [27]: Persistent at-
tributes (such as date of birth and eye color), temporary attributes (such as employer, or-
ganizational role, age), and long-lived attributes (such as passport numbers). Long-lived
and temporary attributes can and will change over time: employees’ role in a company
can change, people can move and change address, and credit cards and digital certiﬁcates
will expire and new ones be obtained and so on. The identity management process must
therefore include good procedures to keep identity attributes up to date to ensure their
correctness. Identity adjustment, reactivation, maintenance, archive and restore are all
activities that are part of the identity update process [11].
2.2.4 Identity Revocation
Identities, including credentials should be revoked if they become obsolete and/or invalid
[23]. The ISO/IEC standard 24760-1 [11] separates revocation into identity attribute sus-
pension and identity deletion. The former means that some or all identity attributes are
made unavailable so that access rights associated with these attributes are made temporar-
ily unavailable to the user. An example of this can be that the association between a user
and a certain group membership is removed to reduce a user’s access rights. Another
example is the deactivation of all access rights associated with a user. Identity deletion
means the complete removal of registered identity information. Information about revo-
cation should be distributed to all relevant stakeholders to ensure that access is not given
based on invalid credentials.
2.2.5 Identity Management Governance
There is a need to have policies in place and govern all steps of the identity management
lifecycle. Regarding creation of identities, for instance, there should be policies in place
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that regulate e.g. who can create identities, how they are created, how the quality of at-
tributes can be assured, how credentials are issued and so on. Flawed and inconsistent
procedures throughout the identity lifecycle can make foundation for severe vulnerabil-
ities that can be exploited by attackers to impersonate users, elevate privileges, perform
denial of service attacks, and so on [26].
2.3 Identity Management Models
The previous sections on identity management and the identity management lifecycle is
primarily concerned with the processes and governance of identity management. The
IdM concept on the other hand must also be backed up by architectures and technical
solutions. There must be systems in place to register identity information, and there must
be mechanisms in place to authenticate users and otherwise take advantage of identity
attributes. At an architectural level, one of the decisions that must be made is concerned
with how the IdM components are distributed. Ahn et al. [14] and Jøsang and Pope [50]
describe that there are three predominant models for IdM:
In isolated IdM Ahn et al. explain that businesses form their own identity domains, and
have their own way of maintaining identities of users, including employees, customers
and partners. That is, each company establishes, uses and maintains a local user reposi-
tory where credentials are stored and used for authentication purposes to access company
internal resources. This example does not exclude single-sign-on to services within a
single company. Jøsang and Pope explain the the isolated model from an Internet-based
viewpoint, where each service provider online keeps a local user repository, and perform
user authentication to authorize access to the own service.
Figure 2.2: Example illustration of isolated IdM
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Figure 2.2 shows an example of isolated IdM, which is the most commonly used model
today. This example illustrates two collaborating companies where an employee from
Company A (EmpA) needs access to resources hosted by Company B. A user proﬁle
(digital identity) is created in both Company A and Company B for EmpA. This infor-
mation is stored and maintained in a company-internal Identity Provider (IdP) service,
which is also used to authenticate the users and issue security tokens/security assertions
used to prove identity in subsequent service requests. In this model each company is re-
sponsible for the identity management lifecycle both for internal employees, and external
collaborators that need access.
The centralized IdM model involves a single IdP that can be used by several other service
providers [50]. The central IdP is responsible for all identity management tasks, such as
registering users, issuing credentials, and authenticating users [14]. Identity assertions are
issued upon a successful authentication process, and these assertions can then be used to
access services outside company borders, or access services distributed across the Inter-
net. IdM lifecycle activities are outsourced to a trusted IdP.
Figure 2.3: Example illustration of centralized IdM
In ﬁgure 2.3 we illustrate how a centralized IdM model could be realized. A trusted IdP
could host all digital identities within a collaborative environment. Successful authentica-
tion towards the IdP would result in a security token that could be used to prove identity
towards both internal and external services. In this illustration, all authorization decisions
are still being made internally, but based upon the centrally issued security token.
The last model that is described is a distributed IdM model. Each company, or service
provider on the Internet can keep a local user repository. Users authenticate towards the
company or service where they are registered. Successful authentication results in an
assertion that can be used to prove identity towards collaborating companies, or online
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services. In this case distributed services do not have to manage external users and their
digital identities.
Figure 2.4: Example illustration of distributed IdM
In ﬁgure 2.4 a distributed example of IdM is illustrated. Employees are enrolled in an
internal IdP within each collaborating company, but the collaborators’ services are con-
ﬁgured to allow service access based on security tokens issued by external collaborators.
All IdM lifecycle activities would be related to a company’s own employees alone.
These three models are conceptual models that illustrate different IdM architectures. Hy-
brid solutions are possible, such as a mix between centralized and distributed models;
Each company can maintain an internal user data base and be responsible for most IdM
lifecycle activities related to own employees, but where a centralized IdP is responsible
user authentication and issuance of security tokens. Such hybrid solutions would require
tight integration between local user databases and the centralized IdP.
2.4 Federated Identity Management
Federated Identity Management (FIM) is a concept that allows cooperation on Identity
Management across corporate boundaries. Within a federation, partners collaborate on
IdM processes, agree on IdM policies, and use interoperable IdM technology. Both the
centralized and distributed IdM models presented in the previous section (section 2.3) are
examples of technical FIM architectures [14]. The most important contrast to the isolated
model, in addition to the technical aspects, is that FIM facilitate identity tasks across se-
curity domains [57], i.e. the identity management lifecycle activities are entrusted to an
entity outside the local company. Smith emphasizes this and states that the fundamental
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concept underlying federations is trust." [74], which is also stressed by Chadwick and In-
man [29]. Collaborators must rely on each other to only create identities for trustworthy
employees, update attributes whenever changes occur, and revoke identities when em-
ployees leave the company. Further, the level of trust between federation partners must
be sufﬁcient to be willing to exchange identity messages between themselves, including
authentication credentials [28] (IdM lifecycle use phase).
FIM is considered a promising approach to facilitate secure resource sharing among col-
laborating partners in heterogeneous IT environments. FIM is about inter-organisation
and inter-dependent management of identity information rather than identity solutions for
internal use, and that it has emerged with the recognition that individuals frequently move
between corporate boundaries [24]. The federation model enables users of one domain to
securely access resources of another domain seamlessly, and without the need for redun-
dant user login processes [17].
2.5 Identity Federation Building Blocks
2.5.1 Technological Building Blocks
There are currently two predominant protocols used for building federated identity man-
agement systems, which are OpenID and the security assertion markup language (SAML)
[57]4. These two protocols are based on similar ideas with respect to federation of iden-
tities and single-sign-on functionality. However, the security requirements driving their
designs are quite different.
The original intention behind the OpenID framework was to create a lightweight, de-
centralized authentication mechanism to avoid blog comment spam [57]. This protocol
would save users the effort of going through a new registration process for each social
media/blog site where they wanted to participate in discussions [30]. Since its origin
in 2005, the OpenID protocol has evolved to become a widely used user-centric online
identity solution. The technology is administered by the OpenID Foundation5. Internet
users can obtain a digital identity by creating a user account at their favourite website that
takes advantage of this technology, and the digital identity can then be used to sign into
other OpenID enabled web sites, in addition to the site where the user registered. OpenID
follows the principles of a distributed IdM model.
Figure 2.5 shows the login screen belonging to the Sourceforge6 software repository.
Users can either create a dedicated user account for this site (isolated IdM model) or
log in by means of the OpenID identity provider services offered by Google, Yahoo or
AOL.
4This paper includes a discussion on a third protocol, the Identity Selector Interoperability Proﬁle un-
derlying Windows Cardspace, which is no longer supported.
5http://openid.net
6http://sourceforge.net/
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Figure 2.5: OpenID enabled website
The OpenID Foundation provides open source libraries so that the general software de-
veloper can realize their own interoperable identity provider solutions, and it provides
plugins to popular content management systems, such as Drupal, Wordpress and phpBB.
SAML is a standard deﬁned by OASIS7, and is an XML-based framework for relaying
asserted identity attributes across organizational boundaries [6]. Maler and Reed explain
that it is an identity solution that serves several purposes, and that its "design is driven
by strong requirements for true, high-value transactions, and privacy" [57]. Unlike the
user-centric, community-driven development of OpenID, SAML is drafted by industrial
companies to meet the goals of professional businesses [30]. OASIS’ claimed beneﬁts of
taking advantage of the SAML technology include:
• Single-sign-on - authenticate once, receive a security/identity token and reuse it to
access resources until its expiry
• Federated identity - use a locally issued security/identity token to access services
from collaborating partners
• Attribute based authorization - a SAML assertion may contain attribute information
that can be used for authorization decisions.
The SAML standard includes a set of basic concepts. Assertions carry information about
a user, such as identity attributes, that an asserting entity claims to be true. The protocols
deﬁned in the standard describes request/response messages used to obtain and relay as-
sertions. Bindings describe how SAML protocols can be mapped to existing messaging
protocols, such as HTTP or the simple object access protocol (SOAP). Proﬁles describe
combinations of assertions, protocols and bindings that can be used to achieve speciﬁc
business oriented use cases.
7http://www.oasis-open.org/
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The SAML assertion speciﬁcation can be used in concert with other technologies, which
can substitute the protocol, bindings and proﬁles deﬁned in SAML. In particular, there
are two more standards that are relevant for building business-oriented federated iden-
tity management infrastructures, namely WS-Trust and WS-Federation. WS-Trust [4]
deﬁnes a security token service framework, which describes how security tokens should
be requested and issued. The framework is general in that it is not bound to one speciﬁc
security token type. However, SAML assertions are one of the token candidates. WS-
Federation [9] complements the WS-Trust framework, and deﬁnes mechanisms to allow
federation between different security domains, so that access to resources managed within
one security domain can be given based on a security token, e.g., a SAML assertion, is-
sued and managed in a different security domain.
Delft and Oostdijk [30] conclude that OpenID should only be used in situations where
the consequences of erroneous authentication are close to zero, which was also the orig-
inal intention; to provide a good enough solution that fulﬁls online users’ needs with
regards to usability, and service providers’ needs to verify that there is a correlation be-
tween the claimed identity and the person who originally created an identity. SAML, and
potentially WS-Trust and WS-Federation should be the preferred choice among the pro-
tocols listed here to be used as federated identity management building blocks in business
environments where the security requirements are stricter, and where the consequences
of erroneous authentications potentially result in breaches on conﬁdentiality, integrity or
availability of valuable assets.
2.5.2 Assurance Frameworks
Trust among collaborators is a fundamental prerequisite for the establishment of iden-
tity federations [74] [29]. Building a secure and trustworthy IdM infrastructure, e.g., by
means of the technologies presented in the previous section (section 2.5.1), may help
in trust establishment. However, the presentation of the identity management lifecycle
in section 2.2 clearly shows that identity management is more than technology; Identity
management is also about processes and policies. The quality and rigor concerning staff
vetting and identity issuance during an employment process can vary substantially be-
tween different companies. Variations in the quality of authentication mechanisms and
strength of authentication credentials will also be found [28]. The same goes for the
quality of identity attribute update and revocation procedures, in addition to governance
mechanisms in general. A company’s level of assurance (LOA) that an external user
really is who he/she claims to be in a FIM environment depends on the collaborators’
registration processes, and the strength of the authentication process [28]. The rigor in
the other IdM lifecycle phases will also affect the assurance level. Common requirements
for carrying out each IdM lifecycle phase among federation partners will contribute to
increased trust. Identity assurance frameworks are documents that include requirements
for each IdM lifecycle phase, and in existing assurance frameworks these requirements
are bundled to form identity assurance levels; the higher the assurance level, the stricter
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requirements. Information about the assurance level of a digital identity can be used by
service providers to determine whether they trust the identity presented to them or not.
The US government deﬁnes four identity assurance levels in their framework [10]:
• Level 1: Little or no conﬁdence in the asserted identity’s validity
• Level 2: Some conﬁdence in the asserted identity’s validity
• Level 3: High conﬁdence in the asserted identity’s validity
• Level 4: Very high conﬁdence in the asserted identity’s validity
Identities that fulﬁl requirements at level 1 can be used to access content that has lim-
ited concerns regarding conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability, while identities fulﬁlling
level 4 requirements can be used to access assets at the highest classiﬁcation level. This
will balance needs for usability and security. Identity assurance contributes to ensure con-
ﬁdence in the vetting process used to establish the identity of the individual to whom the
credential was issued, and conﬁdence that the individual who uses the credential is the
individual to whom the credential was issued [26]. Consequently, identity assurance is
important for the risk management associated with identity management [19].
Examples of identity assurance frameworks can be found within the government sec-
tor, such as the Australian National e-Authentication Framework [7], the US government
Electronic Authentication Guidelines [26], and the Norwegian Framework for Authen-
tication and Non-Repudiation in electronic Communication with and within the Public
Sector [5]. Also the industry supported Kantara initiative has developed an identity assur-
ance framework [75].
2.6 Adoption of Federated Identity Management
There are many examples of federated identity management systems in operation today.
Several of these examples can be seen on the Internet, where large service providers, such
as Facebook and Google act as identity providers, and allow users to access third party
services by means of their Facebook or Google account. These large service providers
offer software development kits (SDK) and application programmer interfaces (API) so
that application developers (for web and mobile apps) can take advantage of existing au-
thentication mechanisms, and attract new users to their services without new registration
processes. Figure 2.5 illustrated one existing example, where the OpenID technology
is used to build an identity federation between an online software repository and three
other service providers that also act as identity providers. Figure 2.6 illustrates a potential
beneﬁt of FIM from a user perspective, through existing federation solutions.
Identity federations are also seen within sectors, such as the government and educational
sectors, further illustrated by two Norwegian examples: The Norwegian government de-
ﬁnes a roadmap to a more digital society in its report "Digital Agenda for Norway" [1],
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Figure 2.6: Example of online identity federation
where it is recognized that Internet-based communication between the government and its
citizens will become increasingly important. Most government agencies provide internet-
based services today, many of which allow access to sensitive and personal content, such
as personal and professional tax data or personal medical information. Secure use of dig-
ital services is of utmost importance. The government has realized that digital identities
enable secure use of digital services, and consequently it has developed a FIM solution
that can and should be used by all online services offered by the government. The result
is that users meet the same familiar login mechanism for all government services. This
digital identity solution is called MinID / ID-porten8. The solution is built on a centralized
IdM model (section 2.3), with SAML (section 2.5.1) as the underlying technology.
The Norwegian educational sector has also chosen to develop an identity federation solu-
tion for its users, called FEIDE9. System administrators at Norwegian campuses can de-
velop services for their students with low overhead, since authentication is "outsourced" to
FEIDE. Students have the beneﬁt of meeting the same login mechanism for the resources
they need access to both at their university and at collaborating universities. The FEIDE
solution is a hybrid of the centralized and distributed IdM models. User administration,
including issuance of user credentials, is performed at the local educational institution.
These local user databases are then integrated with the FEIDE solution, which is used as
a central authentication point. SAML is used as underlying technology.
Academia has been quite optimistic about FIM technology, and through surveys of aca-
demic FIM literature we have seen great effort to move the technology toward academic
8http://www.diﬁ.no/digital-forvaltning/id-porten-minid
9https://www.feide.no/introducing-feide
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perfection [42] [43]. Despite maturing technology and successful examples of identity
federations, however, the FIM adoption rate has been slower than expected [74] [55], and
focused on speciﬁc projects [37]. In the next sections we present our research, which
helps gain a better understanding of FIM, and its potential adoption in the Norwegian oil
and gas industry.
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Chapter 3
Research Context and Design
3.1 Research Context
In section 1.1 we stated that the Norwegian oil and gas industry has migrated towards the
concept of Integrated Operations (IO). Before the modernization of the industry 1) daily
operational decisions were made offshore, 2) plans were made and changed fragmentally
and at ﬁxed times and 3) IT-solutions were specialized and silo-oriented [62]. Around
mid 1990 there was an increasing awareness in the industry that only parts of the data
collected during oil and gas production was being used, and that this amount of data in-
creased drastically. The idea that these data could be used real-time as decision support
and result in better decisions led to a transition to IO. Not only can IO allow decisions to
be based on timelier and accurate data, but the integration of offshore and onshore facil-
ities also allow virtual teams to emerge. Integrated operations improve the effectiveness
of, and information ﬂows within, the collaborative environment, and among the actors we
illustrated in ﬁgure 1.1 [2]. Further the IO concept allows several work processes and de-
cisions to be automated, and it allows vendors to deliver their services digitally [62]. The
desired effect of IO is to allow better decisions to be made, which consequently should
lead to increased proﬁt for the oil companies. The Norwegian Oil and Gas Associations1
has indeed valued the potential of the IO initiative to NOK 250 billion (net present value)
[12].
Integrated Operations has allowed tighter collaboration, through real time data sharing
among the actors in the oil and gas industry. The future vision of the industry, how-
ever, is not fully reached. Although the IT and process control solutions within a single
company have been integrated, there is still work to do to achieve integration across com-
pany borders. Today, most IT-systems used in the IO scenario are designed to support
intra-organisational collaboration. External collaborators e.g. employees external to the
oil company must be given access to the oil company’s internal resources. Thus, each
company incorporates external collaborators in their identity management regimes. The
1previously named Oil Industry Association (OLF)
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Norwegian Oil and Gas Association has a plan for the future; To take the industry a
step further, and also enable inter-organisational collaboration through collaborative IT-
solutions, where partners (Figure 1.1) will share information and knowledge seamlessly
across company borders [78].
The migration towards IO is not without challenges, from an information security point of
view [62] [40]. Jaatun et al. [40] have pointed to the connectivity between traditional of-
ﬁce networks and SCADA systems as a challenge that increases the likelihood of security
incidents. Further, in a workshop with industry participants from one of the IO installa-
tions they found evidence that "information security was not satisfactorily integrated in
projects and new installations", and that "productivity goals sometimes were prioritized
ahead of information security requirements". Jaatun et al.’s study conclude there is indi-
cation of weak emphasis on information security in the industry as a whole2. This is quite
a contrast to the last years threat reports from the Norwegian National Security Author-
ity (NSM), the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) and the Norwegian Intelligence
Service3 where they speciﬁcally point to the oil and gas industry as high value targets for
attackers, and where the threat agents span from international security and intelligence
agencies, via competing industry to hacker groups and private persons.
Information security is key for the integrated operations to be a success in the new threat
landscape, and new means to achieve secure access to IT- and process control systems
must be devised [2]. Tungland and his colleagues have written a report to describe the
reference architecture for next generation of Integrated Operations. Among their sugges-
tions the state that authentication should be carried out at the local company, i.e. the asser-
tion obtained after a successful authentication should be used to access services anywhere
within the collaboration [78]. The FIM concept is speciﬁcally developed for purposes
similar to Tungland’s suggestion. It is interesting to learn more about whether a potential
technology adoption in the Norwegian oil and gas industry can mitigate some of the new
risks that are being introduced with the future generation of integrated operations.
3.2 Research Goal and Questions
Federated identity management as a concept has matured over the last few years, and real
life deployments of FIM solutions show the potential of such systems. Consequently, we
wanted to learn more about FIM and whether it is a concept suitable for the highly col-
laborative Norwegian oil & gas industry. As such, we stated the research goal presented
in section 1.1
After years of research on secure software development [58] [77] [49] [41] we have learnt
2Note that this study was carried out before the Stuxnet, Flame and Duqu virus infections targeted
speciﬁcally at process control systems in the energy sector, and that these incidents have opened the eyes of
the industry to some degree.
3The joint 2013 NSM, PST and intelligence service Threat and Vulnerability Report is found at: http:
//www.pst.no/media/59018/Trusler_og_sarbarheter_2013.pdf
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that it is hard to develop software where security is an inherent property. Development
of secure identity management infrastructures is not different. Security vulnerabilities
continue to show up, also in software whose main purpose is to deliver security services.
Searches on the National Vulnerability Database4 using search phrases such as "active
directory", "OpenID" and "SAML" (which all are mature IdM related technologies) all
return results where related vulnerabilities are rated with high and medium severity, i.e.,
attackers can potentially exploit these vulnerabilities to achieve their goals. A technical
identity management solution with vulnerabilities will lead to a false feeling of being
secure. In most cases this is worse than taking a calculated decision, knowing that your
assets are at risk. In the early PhD work we intended to build a FIM prototype and test the
technology within the oil & gas industry to gain empirical data through prototype testing.
This motivated the ﬁrst research question:
RQ1 What are the main security challenges faced during development of secure identity
management solutions for a distributed service platform?
If the main challenges of building a FIM solution are known prior to development, the
likelihood of avoiding known pitfalls should increase. The answer to this question is
thus a prerequisite to build a secure system that will be accepted for use in an industrial
environment.
RQ2 What empirical evidence exists on the development and adoption of FIM in indus-
try?
Hevner and Ram [36] argue that technology being developed as part of a research strategy
should be relevant. RQ2 was stated to learn from existing experience, and build a solution
based on existing empirical knowledge.
RQ3 What are the beneﬁts and challenges related to FIM from the perspective of the
academic community and the industry, respectively?
RQ3 is motivated by our desire to learn from academic security professionals; What do
they consider as the beneﬁts of taking advantage of FIM, and which challenges have they
identiﬁed related to the technology? These beneﬁts and challenges should certainly be
taken into consideration by industries investigating the possibilities of adoption FIM so-
lutions. Further, it is highly interesting to know the industry’s own perceptions of adopting
the technology in order to tailor solutions to meet their expectations.
3.3 The Applied Research Approach
No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond
the ﬁrst encounter with the enemy’s main strength.
(Helmut von Moltke)
4http://cve.mitre.org/cve
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The results of this PhD project are based on three research methods: design science as
presented by Hevner et al. [35] [36], systematic literature reviews as described by Barbara
Kitchenham [51] and the case study approach described by Robert K. Yin [80].
3.3.1 Design Science: Study 1
The original plan for this PhD work was to follow Hevner and Ram’s [36] framework and
seven guidelines for design science throughout the project. Guideline one is to develop
an artefact. For the purpose of this research the artefact would be an identity management
solution that could be experimented with in a limited scenario within the Norwegian oil
and gas industry. The second guideline is to develop a solution that is relevant to the
selected scenario. The third guideline Hevner and Ram present is to evaluate the designed
artefact. These evaluations can be based on a number of different strategies, such as
simulations, analysis, experiments, case studies or mathematical proofs. The original
idea was to implement a FIM solution and deploy it in a laboratory environment so that
stakeholders in the oil and gas industry could test in a controlled environment. Results
about the ﬁnal FIM solution would be obtained by observation and interviews to catch
their perception of the technology. In their fourth guideline Hevner and Ram say that
design science must lead to clear research contributions, and that the contributions must be
veriﬁable. Further, in guideline ﬁve they claim that research relies upon rigorous methods
in both construction and evaluation. Guideline six describes design science as an iterative
research approach, and that it is a search process to discover an effective solution to a
problem. Hevner and Ram’s last advice (guideline seven) is to communicate the research,
which is a natural part of all PhD works.
The result for this plan would have been a technological FIM solution that had matured
over a number of iterations, and which had been based on stakeholders’ perception of the
technology. The stakeholder perception of FIM concepts would also be an important con-
tribution in this approach. As mentioned, this was the basis for the original plan, however,
things changed after the ﬁrst design science iteration. The artefact subject to ﬁrst iteration
of the design science approach was the Identity Management functionality developed as
part of a healthcare platform within the MPOWER project. In this ﬁrst iteration we fo-
cused on evaluating the security properties of the platform, to ﬁnd its weaknesses before
continuing to adapt it from a healthcare scenario to the industrial oil and gas case. We
wanted to learn more about the challenges of implementing a secure identity manage-
ment solution in a distributed environment, and as such provide answers to RQ1. Later
iterations would contribute to also answering RQ3.
The evaluation (guideline three) of the original artefact (guideline one) showed that the
selected IdM solution contained severe vulnerabilities. In our search to discover a more
effective solution (guideline six) to improve the IdM artefact, we chose to carry out a
systematic literature review (section 3.3.2) to see if a model driven approach to software
development would be a more suitable way to convert the security design of the IdM
solution into secure code. Before the second design science iteration we also wanted
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to study academic literature to improve the relevance of the technical solution (guideline
two). Existing empirical evidence could guide us in the design towards a solution targeted
at the industry (RQ2), and insight into academic work on federated identity management
(RQ3) would inform us how to improve the existing solution. Again, a systematic review
was the selected approach. In both cases the approach was selected to fulﬁl the design
science requirements for rigorous research (guideline ﬁve).
Hevner and March claim that "purposeful artefacts are built to address unsolved prob-
lems" [35]. After initial discussions with stakeholders in the oil and gas industry, we real-
ized that there are many unsolved challenges with respect to Identity Management within
the industry. FIM could as such be a purposeful artefact, however, the meeting with in-
dustry also revealed that the original planned academic approach was a bit naive. The oil
and gas environment and its collaborative nature was far more complex than previously
imagined. It would not be realistic to develop a FIM artefact that could be tested in an
operative setting, at least not within the reach of a one person PhD project. The applica-
bility of laboratory results would be hard to generalize to a real life setting. Thus, lacking
an existing published academic knowledge base and understanding of the oil and gas en-
vironment with respect to information security and identity management, we elected to
deviate from the original research plan. Instead of continuing the artefact development in
a second iteration, we chose to focus effort on creating a knowledge base about the col-
laborative oil and gas environment through a case study (section 3.3.3). This knowledge
should then be used as input by other design science researchers, or FIM developers, to
improve new or existing FIM artefacts to meet industry expectations.
To sum up; Our design science approach includes the ﬁrst iteration of artefact develop-
ment and evaluation. The approach led to two structured literature reviews, and a case
study to create a knowledge base that can be used by later iteration FIM design science.
Further information about the artefact, and the evaluation and analysis of results can be
found in Paper 1 [47] and in two of the supporting papers [49] [66].
3.3.2 Systematic Literature Review: Review 1 and Review 2
Systematic literature reviews are forms of secondary research studies, where existing re-
search about a topic is identiﬁed and synthesized in an objective manner. Barbara Kitchen-
ham has developed guidelines for performing systematic literature reviews within the
software engineering ﬁeld [51]. There are several reasons for performing a systematic
literature review. Kitchenham points to the most common:
• To summarize existing evidence within a research ﬁeld
• To identify gaps and propose further research
• To provide background to position new research initiatives
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Table 3.1: The systematic literature review process
Identiﬁcation of the need for a review
Commissioning a review
Planning Specifying the research question(s)
Developing a review protocol
Evaluating the review protocol
Identiﬁcation of research
Selection of primary studies
Conducting Study quality assessment
Data extraction and monitoring
Data synthesis
Specifying dissemitainon mechanisms
Reporting Formatting the main report
Evaluating the report
Kitchenham argues that there are many advantages of systematic reviews; Rigorous meth-
ods leads to less bias, information about the effects of a phenomenon can be analyzed
across a wide range of settings and empirical methods, and data from different studies can
be combined using meta-analytic techniques. The major disadvantage, however, is that
systematic reviews require considerable more effort than traditional literature reviews5.
The systematic literature review involves three main phases in the review process. Table
3.1 is an overview of these phases and their sub-activities. Further descriptions of the
guideline is found in Kitchenham’s report [51].
Review 1 and review 2 followed the guidelines for systematic review. The need for re-
views was motivated by the design science process as mentioned in the previous section.
In review 1 we were looking for evidence that model driven development could be used as
development strategy for building a more secure identity management artefact to provide
evidence regarding RQ2. In review 2 the use of systematic review was triggered by our
aim to learn more about federated identity management; the beneﬁts and challenges of
adopting such technology (RQ3), and industrial experiences of taking advantage of such
technology (RQ2), which would be used to increase the relevance of the identity man-
agement artefact. All of the three bullet points above were thus drivers for this research
approach.
Systematic mapping studies are another type of review that are complimentary to system-
atic literature reviews [51]. They have broader research questions, search terms will be
less highly focused, the data extraction process is broader, and the analysis stage is about
summarizing the data to answer the research question posed without going into in-depth
analysis techniques such as meta-analysis and narrative synthesis. Kitchenham further
claims that systematic mapping studies are appropriate in situations where very little ev-
idence exists. In our two review studies we found little or no empirical evidence. The
5This statement is conﬁrmed through review 1 and review 2 in this PhD thesis.
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outcomes of the studies are papers giving overviews of the research ﬁelds. As such, one
can argue that our two literature reviews can be categorized as systematic mapping studies
rather than systematic literature reviews, but where a rigorous systematic review approach
has been followed to allow replication of the studies.
The starting point for both reviews was a research protocol where the research questions
and the search strategy were deﬁned. To support the paper selection process, the protocols
also specify inclusion and exclusion criteria. A rigorous and comprehensive search is key
to identify all the relevant scientiﬁc literature. Both sources for scientiﬁc literature and
search phrases were speciﬁed prior to the search. We used four online databases for
scientiﬁc literature to search for studies, for the purpose of review 1:
• IEEE Xplore6
• ACM Digital Library7
• ISI Web of Knowledge8
• Compendex9
According to experiences made by Dybå et al. [31], the use of these databases should be
sufﬁcient to ﬁnd all relevant literature within the information systems ﬁeld. The use of
other databases will lead to duplicate ﬁndings, and as such, lead to extra work. However,
we kept this list and added SpringerLink10 as source in review 2 as a special precaution to
not miss important literature.
Our search strategy identiﬁed a large number of papers in both reviews. All references
and abstracts were imported to the reference tool EndNote, which helped us eliminate
duplicate ﬁndings from the reference database, and to ﬁlter papers based on title and
abstracts. The remaining papers were read in full and sorted according to the inclusion
and exclusion criteria.
Once we had our primary studies we continued to analyze the papers. In review 1 on
model driven development, we grouped all papers treating the same research initiatives
and wrote a narrative for each major initiative. The lack of empirical research eliminated
the need to do a further analysis to answer the research questions. In review 2 we printed
out all primary studies, and color coded academics’ statements about beneﬁts and chal-
lenges of FIM. Coded quotes were then copied into the tool MindManager, and grouped
into similar concepts. This approach shares similarities with the constant comparison
method [69], but was a result of a pragmatic approach to the analysis phase, rather than a
deliberate act to follow the more rigorous constant comparison approach. This pragmatic
and highly manual approach provided insight into qualitative data analysis, which was
used as foundation to learn and improve practices in study 2 (section 3.3.3).
6http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/dynhome.jsp
7http://portal.acm.org/dl.cfm
8http://apps.isiknowledge.com
9http://www.engineeringvillage2.org/
10http://www.springerlink.com
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The model driven development review, including further details, is reported in Paper 2
[45], while the FIM review including details was reported in Paper 3 [42] and Paper 4
[43].
3.3.3 Case Study Research: Study 2
With the recognition that there was a lack of empirical evidence related to industrial adop-
tion of FIM, and that there was a need to develop more knowledge concerning the indus-
trial oil and gas environment, we selected to deviate from the original design science
approach. Hevner and March [35] claim that a design science artefact that solves a non-
existing problem is of equally low importance to the research community as a theory
produced by behavioral-science research that is not useful for the environment. We did
not want to fall into any of these traps, and consequently we elected to follow an empirical
research approach to build new and needed knowledge about current identity management
challenges, and the perception of federated identity management within the oil and gas
industry. This decision, however, affected the original design science research plan, as it
did not allow for more iterations beyond Study 1 within the timeframe of this PhD project.
Robson [64] gives advice on the selection of empirical research strategies. Our research
were going to be exploratory, since our aim was to develop new knowledge about a topic
that was not well documented, nor understood within the industrial research context. Con-
sequently, a ﬂexible (qualitative) design would be appropriate. Robson mentions case
studies, ethnographic studies and grounded theory studies as possible ﬂexible research
strategies. FIM was not implemented in the context we were investigating, so ethno-
graphic studies including participant observation were out of the question. Klein and
Myers argue that interpretive research attempts to understand a phenomena through peo-
ple’s perception of them, and that interpretive research methods are designed to produce
an understanding of an information system’s context [52]. Both case studies and grounded
theory could have been feasible approaches, but the choice fell on a case study strategy
based on the work of Robert K. Yin [80], with inspiration from Klein and Myers’ princi-
ples for conducting and evaluating interpretive ﬁeld studies11 [52].
Robson gives the following deﬁnition of case study research [64]12: "Case study is a
strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular con-
temporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence." It
is emphasized that case study is a strategy rather than a mere data collection method such
as observation or interviews. Yin [80] presents a rigorous approach for carrying out case
studies, which involves six phases: 1) plan, 2) design, 3) prepare, 4) collect, 5) analyze,
6) share. The approach is linear, but at the same time iterative.
In the planning activity we stated the following research questions: What are the industrial
expectations regarding federated identity management? How can the industry beneﬁt
11Klein and Myers state that ﬁeld studies are either in-depth case studies or ethnographies.
12The deﬁnition is inspired by Yin [80].
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from FIM and which challenges will the industry face during adoption of this technology?
These questions contribute to answering this thesis’ research question RQ3.
The study is based on an embedded single case design, where we look at FIM in relation
to the industrial collaboration within the Norwegian oil and gas industry. Our embedded
units of analysis include the most interesting stakeholders within this domain, includ-
ing one oil and gas company, two vendors of production equipment and process control
systems, one consultancy, and one service company. Informants from each of these stake-
holders were included in the study, and a total of eleven informants were selected based
on our industry contacts’ recommendations.
The case study and the research protocol was prepared together with co-supervisor Martin
G. Jaatun, as part of a PhD course on empirical software engineering, whose aim was to
teach research methods applicable to the software engineering ﬁeld. The protocol was
presented in this course and improved based on feedback from the class. The protocol
included the research questions, data collection plan including an interview guide and a
data analysis plan. A pilot test of the interview guide was carried out to further improve
the guide prior to data collection.
The data collection was based on interviews. Multiple sources of evidence should ideally
be obtained and triangulated to strengthen the empirical evidence in case study research
[80]. However, since our study was of an exploratory, interpretative nature and targeted
at perception of technology that had not already been implemented, there would not be
other types of relevant evidence available within this context. Each in-depth interview
lasted between 45 minutes and one hour. We selected a semi-structured approach where
an interview guide was used to obtain the same information from each participant, but
where additional follow-up questions were asked to elaborate on interesting points. The
interviews were held in person and via telephone, and were recorded to allow for full
transcription.
The transcribed interviews were analyzed using the constant comparison method [69].
Data were ﬁrst coded into three preformed categories: perceived beneﬁts of FIM, per-
ceived challenges related to FIM, and current security challenges. The two ﬁrst categories
come directly from the research questions of the study and RQ3 of the thesis. Data sort-
ing into each of these high-level categories were then subject to new iterations of coding
(postformed) to discover common concepts in the interview material within each category.
The qualitative analysis tool Nvivo was used to support the coding and analysis process.
Results from the study was shared with the research community through Paper 5 [46] and
Paper 6 [48].
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Chapter 4
Results
This thesis consists of seven selected papers that highlight different aspects of federated
identity management in collaborative industrial environments. The knowledge shared to
through these papers is synthesized in this chapter. The following sections represent each
of the three research questions stated in section 3.2
Table 4.1: Relations between key ﬁndings, research questions and papers
No Key ﬁnding RQ Paper
1 IdM security speciﬁcations alone do not guarantee secure applications. 1 P1, SP1,
SP2
2 Identity assertions must be properly protected. 1 P1
3 Secure identity management is more than secure technology. 1 P7
4 Little empirical evidence exists on the development and adoption of
federated identity management.
2 P2, P3, P4
5 Academics expect increased privacy, security and usability for end
users.
3 P3
6 Academics expect businesses to beneﬁt from reduced administrative
cost and complexity, improved data quality and security, and easier co-
operation.
3 P3
7 Academics expect technical challenges related to interoperability,
attribute synchronization and consistency, revocation and identity
provider discovery.
3 P4
8 Academics expect organizational challenges related to investment cost,
liability issues, identity assurance, security, knowledge and trust.
3 P4
9 Practitioners perceive that FIM will improve user administration and
usability, make collaboration more efﬁcient, reduce cost, facilitate audit
and lead to better protection.
3 P5
10 Practitioners expect trust issues, technological challenges, investment
cost and security challenges to be obstacles to adoption of FIM in in-
dustry, and there is a risk that they confuse identity management with
access management.
3 P5
11 Practitioners question whether there is sufﬁcient organizational maturity
to adopt new identity management solutions.
3 P5, P6
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4.1 Security Challenges Related to Identity Management
Development (RQ1)
Key ﬁnding 1: IdM security speciﬁcations alone do not guarantee secure applications
Our ﬁrst study (Study 1) was centered around a healthcare service platform. Its identity
and access management services were of direct interest to this PhD project, as described
in section 3.3.1. A thorough process to document security requirements and develop a
secure design was carried out prior to implementation and coding of the services. In sup-
porting paper 1 [49], we document the extensive work that was carried out in relation to
reviewing existing laws and translating these to technical security requirements to ensure
compatibility between the two. Several of the requirements are directly relevant to the
identity and access management solution. In table 4.2 we list the most relevant security
requirements that were elicited in this regard, and give a short description of how they are
relevant for FIM solutions.
In paper 1 [47] we document security challenges related to distributed service environ-
ments. Further, we give a brief introduction to the design of the identity management
modules in the healthcare platform1, before we describe how we tested the security prop-
erties of the implemented solution.
Paper 1 clearly shows a mismatch between the security requirements, the security design
and the implemented solution. This situation is also conﬁrmed by a second and more
extensive security test of the platform presented in Supporting paper 2 [66]. Both tests
revealed severe security vulnerabilities. In supporting paper 2 we argue that there is a
need to focus on security throughout the software development lifecycle. The security
work is not done when the security speciﬁcation is delivered. Further, we conclude that
"the main lesson learned is that it is necessary that every person involved in such a project
[development project] is aware of the consequences of not thinking about, implementing
and testing security from the beginning. Only then will it be possible to achieve more
secure systems". [66]
Key ﬁnding 2: Identity assertions must be properly protected
Federated identity management is about inter-organizational collaboration, and sharing
of identity data across organizational boundaries and security domains. Internet is one of
the communication means that can be used to relay identity information. It is difﬁcult to
control how digital information is being used behind ﬁrewalls, inside the trusted organi-
zational premises. Once information has left the security domain, this control goes from
difﬁcult to impossible, unless proper security controls are applied to the information. Con-
ﬁdentiality and integrity controls become extremely important to prevent unauthorized
access to, or modiﬁcation, of data. Identity assertions are used to prove identity at an
1a design based on the security requirements speciﬁed in Supporting Paper 1.
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Table 4.2: Security requirements from privacy legislation and their relevance to FIM
Security requirements from [49] Relevance to FIM solutions
Services should identify and verify the
identity of their human users before al-
lowing them access to their resources.
Services that provide access to assets that
need protection should utilize access con-
trol mechanisms. A FIM solution could
be the choice to achieve identiﬁcation and
veriﬁcation (i.e. authentication) in a dis-
tributed environment
Services should identify and verify the
identity of corresponding services before
they are allowed to communicate.
Identity management should not only be
associated with human users, but also ser-
vices and equipment. If not, attackers can
spoof other services or equipment to ob-
tain service access.
Services should verify the authorization
level of users before access to sensitive
data can be given.
The FIM identity assertions will likely be
used in the authorization process in dis-
tributed FIM environments.
The platform should be able to detect
unauthorized manipulation of data that is
being transmitted.
FIM assertions contain information about
the authentication status, and possibly
identity attributes that can be used to take
authorization decisions. As such, it is of
utmost importance to hinder unauthorized
manipulation of these to prevent opportu-
nities for users to elevate their privileges.
The platform should be able to log se-
curity incidents, such as failed login at-
tempts or unauthorized access attempts to
services in order to discover and trace sys-
tem abuse.
Information sent in the FIM identity as-
sertion, along with the service requests,
can facilitate logging and tracing of indi-
viduals’ activities.
Data freshness should be controlled to
prevent chances of replay attacks.
Authorization decisions are based on the
FIM identity assertions. If the right pre-
cautions are not taken, a "man-in-the-
middle" can copy these assertions and re-
send them at a later time to obtain service
access.
external service, without the need to do a local authentication. Further, identity attributes
may be used as input to role based or attribute based authorization decisions. Adversaries
can craft their own identity assertions, or modify existing ones if identity assertions are
not properly protected. This is why security requirements like the ones presented in table
4.2 are particularly important in federated environments. In Paper 1 [47] we demonstrated
several challenges related to unprotected identity assertions:
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• Lack of conﬁdentiality protection allowed us to inspect all identity attributes. This
may reveal sensitive identity data.
• Lack of integrity protection allowed us to modify identity data. Lack of integrity
protection means that adversaries may be allowed to elevate or remove access priv-
ileges associated with an identity.
• Identity assertions were vulnerable to replay attacks. We could record the data
ﬂows between to entities, including identity data. The identity data could be resent
at a later time, and successfully be used as authentication proof since there were no
mechanisms to control its freshness.
In addition to this we veriﬁed whether entity authentication was implemented at a service
level. Since this was not the case we were allowed to craft service requests directly to-
wards the identity assertion service (security token service), and as such omit the whole
authentication process. One can argue that the application we tested was not represen-
tative for real production solutions, however, it illustrates how bad things can go if the
identity management solutions contain errors and security vulnerabilities. Implementa-
tion errors are made, also in operational systems: CVE-2008-3891 is one example of a
high severity vulnerability that was discovered in relation to the SAML identity assertion
issued by one of the larger service providers on the Internet. Before the vulnerability was
corrected, it allowed "remote service providers to impersonate users at arbitrary service
providers"2.
The use of identity assertions in FIM environments make them as attractive and vul-
nerable to theft and exploitation as traditional user credentials, such as usernames and
passwords. With a wider adoption of federated identity management solutions, we may
in the future experience identity assertion phishing in the same scale as that of traditional
phishing and spear phishing for usernames and passwords. Further, if identity assertions
can be exploited, then the whole authentication process is circumvented, no matter how
many authentication factors are used or what strength of authentication mechanisms is
employed.
Key ﬁnding 3: Secure identity management is more than secure technology
The ﬁrst two key ﬁndings highlight the importance of a solid, high quality development
strategy for the technical identity management platform, and with a special focus on se-
curing the identity assertions. Identity management, however, is more than technology,
as we wrote in section 2.2. In Paper 7 [44] we carried out threat modeling of each iden-
tity management lifecycle phase. For each phase we listed the most likely threats. The
conclusion is that if one activity carried out in one of the lifecycle phases is ﬂawed, then
the assets being protected by the identity management solution is at risk. Following is a
summary of the associated threats, as reported in Paper 7. The ﬁgures represent threat
models, using the misuse case diagram notation of Sindre and Opdahl [72].
2http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2008-3891&cid=2
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There are numerous motives for attackers to somehow manipulate the identity creation
process, one of which is to assume the identity of another person during the establishment
of a digital identity. This can, e.g., be done as shown in Figure 4.1 by presenting forged
identity information (e.g. false passport) during the identity prooﬁng process, or exploit
the fact that identity prooﬁng is not operationalized in the creation process. University
enrollment under a fake alias, establishment of credit cards or establishment of phone
subscriptions in another person’s name are examples of this threat. The consequence of
this is that the attacker obtains full access to resources by means of a valid user identity.
Figure 4.1: Threats to the identity creation phase
Invalid attributes can be inserted in the user database, attributes can be modiﬁed by unau-
thorized entities, or valid, but false attributes can be registered during the attribute reg-
istration if proper countermeasures against these threats are not in place. The effects of
this must be seen in light of speciﬁc system implementations, and an analysis of how the
attributes are being used. Still, we must acknowledge that these threats can have serious
consequences knowing that attributes can be used to determine access level e.g. based on
group memberships/roles in role based access control (RBAC) schemes or possibly any
other attribute in attribute-based access control (ABAC) schemes. Attackers can obtain
elevated privileges for their own valid user account by manipulating attributes. The cre-
dential registration process must also be protected so that attackers cannot steal or copy
credentials, such as username password pairs. If attackers get access to valid credentials,
they can impersonate valid users to obtain protected information. If the attackers mod-
ify credentials the result can be that they alone possess the valid credentials to access
resources, or that they block access for another user. These challenges also exist during
delivery: Attackers can obtain access to digital identities, which can be used in subse-
quent malicious activities by intercepting the communication channel used to deliver the
credentials, such as mail or e-mail.
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Most users of IT systems recognize that there is risk involved in the use of online services,
especially related to use of digital identities. Figure 4.2 illustrates typical threats related
to use of digital identities. Access credentials can be lost or stolen so that attackers can
authenticate, and thereby impersonate valid users. There are many attack vectors used to
obtain valid credentials. Communication lines can be intercepted to copy plaintext data,
password ﬁles can be stolen and decrypted, social engineering can be used to trick users
into giving away their credentials, and so on. The introduction of SSO and federated SSO
has added to this complexity in that security assertions are issued based on a successful
authentication. This security assertion is stored by the client and used as proof of identity
in subsequent service requests. This means that an attacker can copy this assertion and
add it to malicious service requests, or replay previously sent messages. If the receiving
service trusts this assertion, it will provide information as requested. Since authentication
data (assertions) are shared across services in SSO, and across services within different
trust domains in federated SSO, the attack surface in weakly designed systems is greatly
increased compared to having separate systems.
Figure 4.2: Threats to the identity use phase
In addition to these impersonation threats, there is always a probability that one of the
entities in a trusted communication repudiates that a given transaction has taken place. In
an e-commerce context, users can deny that they have placed an order, or deny that they
have accepted terms of use if the service providers do not take precautions. Similarly,
service providers can deny that they have received information or requests from users.
As already mentioned, RBAC and ABAC models allow taking access control decisions
based on identity attributes. If attackers can modify attributes during transmission, they
38
can be allowed to elevate their privileges by manipulating attributes. Another scenario is
that attackers modify, e.g., shipping address so that ordered goods is paid by one user, but
is sent to the attacker’s destination. The disclosure of identity attributes may also violate
user’s privacy preferences, or reveal company internal information.
Figure 4.3 illustrates typical threats to the update phase. Similar threats can be found in
the create and update phase: credentials can be copied or stolen and false attributes can
be provided. It is still interesting to treat them separately. In operative environments one
can experience that the responsibility for identity creation and identity update are placed
at different levels in the organization. While the human resource department may be re-
sponsible for creation of user identities, e.g., in connection with a new employment, the
responsibility for updating user proﬁles may lie with the IT-support department. Con-
sequently, attackers can approach different parts of an organization to achieve the same
goals.
Figure 4.3: Threats to the update phase
It is also important to note that attackers can exploit weaknesses in the update procedures.
Delays in the update procedure can allow users to access content based on old but still
valid access credentials and attributes, and attacks towards update management interfaces
can allow unauthorized reactivation of user accounts.
For the revocation phase it is hard to see that suspension and deletion of identity infor-
mation can be misused otherwise than to block access to resources, i.e. to deny service
to authorizes users. The conﬁdentiality and integrity of assets will as such be maintained,
but if resource availability is a critical success factor, then this kind of denial of service
attack can have major consequences.
Figure 4.4 also indicates that insufﬁcient distribution of revocation lists, e.g., in distributed
systems can be exploited by attackers. Distributed services without an updated access
revocation list can continue to grant access, even after the credentials have been revoked
ofﬁcially.
Figure 4.5 provides an overview of threats that are related to identity management gov-
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Figure 4.4: Threats to the revocation phase
ernance. Password policies are among the policies that affect all phases of the identity
management lifecycle, so let’s use this as an example. The password policy should in-
clude requirements for password length, complexity and validity period. It should also
contain statements about the password being personal, and that it should not be shared
with anyone.
As indicated in the ﬁgure, attackers can exploit weak or non-existent polices throughout
the phases of the identity management lifecycle. If a password policy is non-existent or
weak, then users can associate their digital identities with insecure passwords. This af-
fects the use of the digital identity. Since the password is weak and can easily be hacked,
e.g., through brute force attacks or guessing attacks, then there is a challenge to estab-
lish trust that the the entity requesting a service is who he claims to be. Non-existent or
poor requirements for password change (update) and revocation also affect the trustwor-
thiness of credentials. With inﬁnite password lifetime, attackers can exploit compromised
credentials as long as the user account is active.
Policy incompliance means that policies exist, but that they are not complied to, e.g., due
to lack of policy enforcement. It does not help to have password length and complexity
requirements if the technical platform still allows users to select shorter and weaker pass-
words. Further, many users will continue to reuse their passwords after expiry, despite a
policy stating that passwords are valid for 90 days and that reuse is not allowed.
Figure 4.5: Threats to the identity management governance
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Even if policies are in place and compliance is achieved throughout the organization,
attackers can exploit ﬂawed and inconsistent identity management procedures.
Source Papers
• Paper 1: Jostein Jensen, Åsmund Ahlmann Nyre: "SOA Security - an experience
report", Proc. The Norwegian Information Security Conference (NISK), 185-196,
2009
• Paper 7: Jostein Jensen, "Identity Management Lifecycle - Exemplifying the
need for Holistic Identity Assurance Frameworks". Information and Commu-
nicatiaon Technology, volume 7804 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
343-352. Springer, 2013
• Supporting paper 1: Jostein Jensen, Inger Anne Tøndel, Martin Gilje Jaatun, Per
Håkon Meland, Herbjørn Andresen, Reusable Security Requirements for Health-
care Applications, International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Secu-
rity (ARES), 380 - 385, 2009.
• Supporting paper 2: Richard Sassoon, Martin Gilje Jaatun, Jensen, Jostein, The
Road to Hell is Paved with Good Intentions: A Story of (In)secure Software
Development, International Conference on Availability, Reliability, and Security
(ARES), 501 - 506, 2010
4.2 Empirical Evidence on FIM Development and Adop-
tion (RQ2)
Key ﬁnding 4: Little empirical evidence exists on the development and adoption of
federated identity management
Within this PhD project we have carried out two systematic reviews3. One was related to
the use of model driven development (MDD) to implement more secure software, and the
other to learn more about various aspects of federated identity management. Both studies
included research questions to evaluate empirical research within these ﬁelds. Our ﬁrst
search4 in the MDD study reported in Paper 2returned 2844 titles to be evaluated. A
follow-up search a year later5 returned yet another 27 titles. The exclusion of papers
based on irrelevant titles left us with 366 papers for which we also read the abstract. 122
(plus the 27 from round two) papers were studied in full on the security in MDD topic.
3that turned out to be systematic mapping studies following the search and selection rigor of a systematic
review, ref. our discussion in section 3.3.2
4First search carried out March, 2010.
5Second search carried out June, 2011.
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We might have lost some empirical papers in the ﬁrst ﬁlter process due to misleading
titles. Further, we might have overseen some empirical work if the abstracts were not
clear on the contributions. However, the rigor in the search and ﬁltering process allow us
to claim with high conﬁdence that most research is based on conceptual analysis, rather
than empirical evaluations of the technology.
Paper 3 and Paper 4 describe the search process for papers on federated identity manage-
ment. Our initial search resulted in 684 titles. A ﬁltering based on title and abstract left
us with 113 papers that were read in full. Paper 3 includes 30 primary studies reporting
the beneﬁts of FIM, while Paper 4 includes 29 primary studies that indicate academics’
views on challenges related to FIM. Again, none of the included studies presented empir-
ical evidence. This was a bit surprising, keeping in mind that there are existing federated
identity management solutions in operation, as we presented in section 2.6. One can argue
that our search strategy prevented us from ﬁnding all published work related to federated
identity management. We restricted our search to the phrase "federated identity manage-
ment". As such, we might have overseen studies where they used other terms for the same
concept, for instance identity federation or inter-organizational single-sign-on. However,
in our later work we have not seen other empirical studies within this ﬁeld. This make
us claim with moderate to high conﬁdence that empirical research related to federated
identity management is sparse.
Source Papers
• Paper 2: Jostein Jensen, Martin Gilje Jaatun: "Not Ready for Prime Time: A Sur-
vey on Security in Model Driven Development", International Journal of Secure
Software Engineering, 49-61, 2011
• Paper 3: Jostein Jensen: "Beneﬁts of Federated Identity Management - A Sur-
vey from an Integrated Operations Viewpoint", Availability, Reliability and Se-
curity for Business, Enterprise and Health Information Systems, volume 6908 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1-12, 2011
• Paper 4: Jostein Jensen: "Federated Identity Management Challenges", Proc.
Seventh International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES
’12), 230-235, 2012
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4.3 Beneﬁts and Challenges of FIM Adoption (RQ3)
4.3.1 From Academics’ Viewpoint
Key ﬁnding 5: Academics expect increased privacy, security and usability for end
users
In Paper 3 we show that academics have been quite optimistic about the beneﬁts of adopt-
ing FIM solutions. From a user perspective academics claim that one should experience
increased privacy protection [22] [54] by having more control over own identity attributes.
Users’ security should be increased [56] [22] since they only have to remember one, or at
least a very limited set of username/password pairs, and as such should be able to use and
remember stronger passwords. Single-sign-on and seamless access to resources should
improve usability [56] [57] aspects.
Key ﬁndings 6: Academics expect businesses to beneﬁt from reduced administrative
cost and complexity, improved data quality and security, and easier cooperation
Paper 3 also presents beneﬁts from a business side; Companies can experience reduced
cost [74] [22] [28] related to identity management tasks by avoiding duplication of iden-
tity management efforts among the federation partners. Improved data quality [22] [33]
can be experienced because user data is stored and maintained at one site, avoiding syn-
chronisation issues. Increased security [22] [63] [18] can be achieved with FIM since
security principles such as avoiding single-point-of-failure and to achieve minimal dis-
closure of data can be fulﬁlled, and ﬁne-grained access control can be realised. Ser-
vice providers can experience reduced complexity [15] by outsourcing identity tasks to
specialised identity providers. Finally, FIM promises to facilitate cooperation [22] [70]
among federation partners where cross-domain single-sign-on and seamless service ac-
cess across company boundaries can be a result.
Key ﬁnding 7: Academics expect technical challenges related to interoperability, at-
tribute synchronization and consistency, revocation and identity provider discovery
Key ﬁnding 5 and 6 show that the academic community has high expectations with regard
to the beneﬁts of FIM. However, the road towards federated identity environments is full
of potholes, as we explain in Paper 4. Interoperability issues are among the technical chal-
lenges that must be overcome. FIM will ﬁt well into homogeneous environments where
all collaborators use the same standard [79]. Most inter-organizational collaborative envi-
ronments, however, are heterogeneous in nature, which means that different organizations
adhere to different standards, tools and procedures. This increases the complexity of FIM
adoption. Even in homogeneous environments there might be challenges. Vendors of FIM
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solutions can claim to follow a recognized standard, but due to the number of protocol op-
tions in the standard and conformance variations among the vendors, there might still be
integration challenges [57]. A prerequisites for interoperable FIM solutions is a com-
mon agreement regarding the identity attributes to be used, and their semantics [76] [22].
There are also other technical challenges to consider in federated identity environments.
FIM solutions must be designed to avoid inconsistencies in identity attributes within the
federation, and proper mechanisms must be developed to properly synchronize replicated
identity information [38] [39] [67]. Other technical challenges are concerned with how
the identity provider is discovered [57], especially in environments where users can be
part of multiple federations [63], and how to develop practical and effective revocation
mechanisms [22] [71].
Key ﬁnding 8: Academics expect organizational challenges related to investment
cost, liability issues, identity assurance, security, knowledge and trust
Paper 4 also show organizational challenges one may run into regarding FIM. At the or-
ganisational level cost [57] may be an issue. There might be a need to make considerable
investments in new technology in order to make FIM work, and complexities related to
the integration and deployment may demand excessive resources . A cost-beneﬁt analysis
is needed to see if the value of the promises of FIM, such as reduced administration costs,
exceeds the investments. Liability [74] [25] is another issue that needs to be considered.
Federations may span across organizations with different internal rules and regulations,
and across jurisdictional borders, both at national and international level. Who is respon-
sible if/when systems and processes fail and rules are broken? Related to this, there are
also assurance [20] [21] issues that need to be considered. Assurance is the process of
ensuring that identity management in under appropriate control. Different organizations
may have different processes and requirements for their staff enrolment and vetting proce-
dures, and to come up with agreements among the federation partners may not be trivial.
An important use case of FIM is cross-domain single sign on (SSO). The fact that one
ID can be used to access several services across company borders is good for usability
purposes, however, it also involves a serious drawback; The SSO use case increases the
attack surface, thus increases the risk of data disclosure [56] [13] of private data. Related
to all of the above is trust, as we have already mentioned [74] [70] [68] [28]. However,
trust issues are complex; there might be willingness to establish trust relationships be-
tween individuals and third parties, but this might not be achievable at an organizational
level, and vice versa.
Source Papers
• Paper 3: Jostein Jensen: "Beneﬁts of Federated Identity Management - A Sur-
vey from an Integrated Operations Viewpoint", Availability, Reliability and Se-
curity for Business, Enterprise and Health Information Systems, volume 6908 of
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Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1-12, 2011
• Paper 4: Jostein Jensen: "Federated Identity Management Challenges", Proc.
Seventh International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES
’12), 230-235, 2012
4.3.2 From Practitioners’ Viewpoint
Key ﬁnding 9: Practitioners perceive that FIM will improve user administration and
usability, make collaboration more efﬁcient, reduce cost, facilitate audit and lead to
better protection
Paper 5 provides insight into practitioners’ perceptions of federated identity management.
More effective user administration and improved quality on the identity data are
among the perceived beneﬁts. More than half of the interviewees mention that they be-
lieve that the adoption of FIM will rationalize the user administration process, and im-
prove the quality of recorded identity attributes. One interviewee commented: "you could
rationalize the user account systems at different companies if you have a cooperation
among them.", and another supplemented: It is obvious that there will be less user ad-
ministration if we could integrate our login systems". Our interviewees also mentioned
improved usability as a consequence of single-sign-on as a perceived beneﬁt of FIM. Es-
pecially the contractors see the advantage of being able to experience fewer login requests
in order to do their job.
Representatives from both operators and contractors talked about improved efﬁciency
of collaboration as a possible beneﬁt of FIM adoption. One of the representatives from
the operator drew the parallel between standardization of equipment and standardization
of identity and access management within the oil and gas industry: "The efﬁciency will
increase and thus our cost is reduced, if [everyone] meets the same [access control]
systems when they go from one operator to another."
Efﬁcient user administration and efﬁcient collaboration are factors directly linked to a
desire to reduce cost. Both the operator side and the contractor side can gain from ra-
tionalized user administration. The operator has an expectation that FIM can reduce cost
due to more efﬁcient work processes.
Some of today’s systems operate with service accounts, which are shared by several en-
gineers. While this simpliﬁes everyday work tasks, it makes detection and audits of po-
tential misuse difﬁcult. A beneﬁt mentioned by one of the interviewees is that FIM is
perceived to facilitate audit in the systems since every user has a personal user account,
and that it will be beneﬁcial to be able to trace who does what.
With adoption of FIM the interviewees expect to have to manage fewer user accounts and
passwords, which led one of them to express that "the perceived security will increase.
Fewer passwords will be written down on paper." The interviewees also believe that the
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quality of user attributes, which is used to make authorisation decisions, will increase and
that the access revocation process will be more efﬁcient. This is highly relevant to ensure
good protection of company resources.
This text is extracted from Paper 5, where more details and examples can be found.
Key ﬁnding 10: Practitioners expect trust issues, technological challenges, invest-
ment cost and security challenges to be obstacles to adoption of FIM in industry,
and there is a risk that they confuse identity management with access management
Paper 5 also documents the challenges related to FIM, as perceived by practitioners, and
the following text is extracted from this paper.
Smith [74] argues that trust is the fundamental concept underlying federations. At the
same time he points to the fact that there are challenges related to establishment of trust.
Trust issues are highly relevant for the inter-organizational collaboration, which takes
place in the Norwegian oil & gas industry. One of the representatives we talked with said:
"We [...] collaborate with a license partner in one oil ﬁeld. [...] At the same time we are
strong competitors, so it is essential that only information concerning the collaboration is
available to them." Whether you trust other companies or not is very context-dependent,
and the level of trust is difﬁcult to deﬁne. One interviewee pointed to one of the reasons: "I
think people are slightly more sceptical of the neighbouring business considering the big
money that swirl around in the oil and gas industry." "The contractors will never be able
to handle the processes behind federation." This statement by one of the representatives
from the operator is illustrative to the question of whether the collaborators ﬁnd each
other trustworthy enough to perform all identity management within each company. At
the same time he said that it would be easier to trust some of their large contractors with
which they have well-established cooperative frameworks.
There are several challenges with the introduction of FIM from a technological perspec-
tive. The complexity of IT systems in the IO domain is high, and span regular ofﬁce
tools to small tailored expert systems on the software side. At the network layer they
operate both with traditional IP-networks and specialized process control systems. One
of the interviewed security professionals stated: "It would be a dream come true if ev-
eryone could connect to a common platform - an information bus - where all information
could be shared securely [...] but it is hard to believe that it will be possible." Further,
he explained that identity federations might be possible in the future for some of their
large partners and for some of their large systems. It can, however, be more difﬁcult for
smaller systems originating from small companies, who might not have the competency
or economic baseline to integrate their systems with other federated systems according to
standardization and interoperability needs.
Representatives from the operator told us they have tried open source federation technolo-
gies in a few cases. However, they experienced some technological challenges, especially
related to the technology management. "It is much easier to rely on technology from Mi-
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crosoft, for instance, rather than a product from a party that is not as big commercially".
With this he implied that the large software companies would have to come up with solu-
tions that fulﬁll the industry’s needs before they will consider the technology in a larger
scale. A second interviewee stated: "The challenge with federated identities, as I under-
stand it, is that there is no dominating standard. [...] You need a bouquet of different
technologies."
A software developer in our study argued that that despite the rapid development of tech-
nology that can have high beneﬁt internally in a company there are still considerable
challenges as soon as you get outside company borders where you meet equipment from
different vendors, different security policies, ﬁrewall setting and so on. Even if software
and hardware interfaces were compatible, there are still challenges with the interpretation
of data originating from different systems, especially regarding semantics. These consid-
erations are very valid when looking at integration of identity management systems. Both
software and hardware interfaces must be standardized. Protocol options must be deﬁned
so that all the equipment is interoperable and the semantic meaning of identity attributes
must be deﬁned and agreed upon. Several of the interviewees mention that the industry
must agree on common guidelines for FIM at a detailed level for it to be successful.
During the interviews we asked the candidates if they saw any potential showstoppers for
adoption of a common FIM platform in the Norwegian IO context. "Who’s gonna pay for
the fun?" was the immediate response of a consultant in our study. He then elaborated:
"It is obvious that all the participants in such collaboration will have to make major
changes to get this up and running. That is a cost I’m not sure they are willing to take."
Representatives from three of the four contractors in our study conﬁrmed this view. "We
have to consider that we are delivering services [to oil companies] globally. It will be
costly for us to implement a system for collaboration only with our Norwegian partners,
one of the interviewees said. The two other representatives were concerned about the
funding for implementation of federation technology. We don’t develop anything that
is not paid for by someone." Even though the representatives from the operator did not
mention funding as a factor, they all recognized that the investment cost of a FIM solution
will be considerable.
Security issues are also a major concern in the industry. "Our biggest fear is that some-
one unauthorized can get access to, and control a production process." More than half
of the interviewees were concerned that FIM will increase the attack surface of their sys-
tems. "The drawback is that someone could authenticate as another user. She would then
automatically get access [...] to all the companies where this user has access rights."
Identity theft is obviously a serious concern, but the interviewees are not only worried
about hackers with sinister intentions: "The risk of unintended errors increases. Some-
one can cause situations by mistake since they don’t understand the consequences beyond
their own company." Some are also concerned that there will be fewer explicit barriers
between systems of different criticality. They feel that they lose control when the systems
are being accessed transparently. Privacy aspects related to FIM is currently a hot research
topic. However, only one of the interviewees mentioned privacy as a concern. "It would
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be fantastic to just have one digital identity to relate to, which you could use for every-
thing. The drawback, however, is that you can trace what people are doing. [...] It might
not be that important in this context, but often it is ok to know that you act anonymously
so that you don’t have to account for everything you do."
A major challenge related to identity management in general is to keep user databases
and users’ access rights up to date. One of the foreseen beneﬁts of FIM is that it will be
easier to keep the identity data up-to-date. However, more than half of the interviewees
still think there will be challenges, despite identity federations. "I’m not so sure if we will
experience less administration with such a system. I guess we [...] will get fewer users
to administer, but I’m not sure about this simpliﬁcation." He continues to argue that there
will still need to be processes to trust each speciﬁc user before they can be authorized to
access systems, and that it will be necessary to implement processes to verify the qual-
ity of federation partners’ identity management processes. The interviewees emphasized
the need to fully control the authorization part of the access control. The authentication
service can be outsourced to a trusted third party or users can be authenticated within
their home organization, but there is still a need to have strict control on which, or what
type of users have access to the organisation’s resources. However, here there is a risk of
confusing identity management with authorization, since this authorization process is
already being performed today, only with the added chore of local identity management
in each case.
Key ﬁnding 11: Practitioners question whether there is sufﬁcient organizational ma-
turity to adopt new identity management solutions
We document some of the challenges the oil & gas industry is faced with today both in
Paper 5 and Paper 6. The following text is extracted form Paper 6.
The oil and gas industry in Norway is collaborative and competitive at the same time.
That is, the same companies that are competing to win a project bidding are often at the
same time collaborating on another project. The government sometimes even require oil
companies to use shared production facilities in order to make smaller oil-ﬁelds proﬁtable.
Thus, at times oil companies must utilize the infrastructure of their competitors in order to
operate their own oil ﬁelds. As noted by one of the interviewees "We see more and more
of this. Many of the newly discovered oil reservoirs are small, and does not justify a full
size production facility. Subsea installations, however, can be ’put to operation’ and then
utilize nearby production facilities." For suppliers and contractors it is also the norm that
they collaborate with their competitors. Two companies competing for a contract may at
the same time depend on each other to deliver on another project. Further, there is also a
constant battle for suppliers and contractors to increase their share of the contracts, such
that they are also in a kind of competition. Further, the complexity and novelty of oil and
gas installations require extensive collaboration and sharing of resources. Thus, the oil
and gas industry needs to share access to their assets while at the same time protecting
them.
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The extensive collaboration between companies in the oil and gas industry makes it neces-
sary for external users to access company-internal resources. Currently, there is no collab-
oration on the management of identities, and therefore companies issue user identities to
individual users of external companies whenever this is required. One of our interviewees
explained a complex situation where the company has approximately 20.000 employees,
but administer more than 70.000 user accounts in their IT-systems. Coupling this with the
fact that the oil industry at large experiences an estimated 40.000 internal and external job
changes per year, it is evident that managing user identities is far from trivial.
While ofﬁce systems in general utilize a centralized user database and authentication
mechanism, many process control systems are not designed to be integrated with existing
access control solutions. As a result, several of these expert systems have their own user
database, with their own user identities and authentication mechanisms. Thus, changes
to a single user’s identity attributes (e.g. role in the organization) must be propagated to
many systems, both internally and externally.
Offshore installations run continuous operations and require constant monitoring. As one
of the interviewees stated "one operator can’t log off, and a new log in, since critical
situations can appear in that timeframe". Consequently, many of the operational sys-
tems utilize shared user accounts for all operators, and sometimes these usernames and
passwords are recorded in a book lying next to the operator terminal. Our interviewees
recognize that this is a risk, but the alternative of not being able to access a system is con-
sidered worse. Shared accounts add to the challenges of maintaining identities and access
rights, since it is very difﬁcult to determine who has access to these shared accounts (i.e.
who knows the password?).
Ofﬁce system users are commonly granted a default set of access rights initially aimed
at internal users. As a consequence, external users get access to internal services such
as e-mail (with an e-mail address), access to the company management solution, access
to employees’ calendars and more, regardless of whether they need it or not. This is
excessive for a person that "needs to monitor our need for methylated spirit or need for
cabbage", an interviewee explained.
Despite the fact that user accounts are considered personal, another way of handling prob-
lems with improper access rights is to share user identities and authenticators between
personnel. Both representatives from the operator and contractors admit that sharing of
user identities takes place. The person borrowing a co-worker’s identity often has valid
access, but has forgotten his security token or it has expired. The process of getting a new
one is cumbersome, bureaucratic and in most cases time-consuming. Thus, while waiting
for a user ID an employee might be needed to do a job and therefore borrows an ID from
a colleague. Operators are aware of the situation, but explained that "when a situation
causes half a million of lost revenue per minute, this is bound to happen."
Oil and gas installations typically remain active for decades and therefore some of the
corresponding tailor-made process control systems are old. As in many industries, com-
panies are reluctant to update or replace systems since this may negatively impact the
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production. As one of the information security specialists stated in an interview: "We
have state of the art systems, but it is state of the art from 1985 in some cases". As the
threat environment has substantially changed, security technology has to a large extent
been built like fortresses around the computer systems and relies heavily on traditional
network defense mechanisms. Firewalls and IP-based access control lists are used to con-
trol network activity to and from resources. "Security is unfortunately not as integrated
in our systems as we would like, but that is why ﬁrewall ﬁltering and anti-virus scans are
so important to us."
On the question on whether there had been discussions concerning integration of user
databases, on of the interviewees replied: "That question has never been raised. Most oil
companies have clear rules preventing it". "What holds [FIM] back is the same challenge
we experienced when we ﬁrst introduced the Integrated Operations concept. People are
satisﬁed with the way they work today, and do not want change." This indicates that
practitioners question whether there is organizational maturity to adopt FIM solutions in
the industry. At the same time the current challenges should motivate for the introduction
new security concepts. "Ten years ago, when some of our customers started [with IO], it
was nearly impossible to get inside their premises with a computer. Now we get access to
networks, get IP addresses, and so on." This comment was made by one of the interviewed
contractors and it show that despite a slow moving industry, there is a constant change in
attitude when it comes to taking advantage of new communication technology to facilitate
sharing of data.
Source Papers
• Paper 5: Jostein Jensen, Martin Gilje Jaatun: "Federated Identity Management -
We Built It; Why Won’t They Come?", IEEE Security & Privacy, 34-41, 2013
• Paper 6: Jostein Jensen, Åsmund Ahlmann Nyre: "Federated Identity Manage-
ment and Usage Control - Obstacles to Industry Adoption", Eighth Interna-
tional Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES ’13), 2013
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Chapter 5
Discussion and Implications of Results
5.1 Evaluation of Contributions
In the following we will look at our key ﬁndings in regard to how they have implication
for:
• IT strategy planners and solution architects
• Researchers
• IdM software developers and product manufacturers
We end the chapter with a discussion of the main limitations of our work, and suggest
some directions for further work.
5.1.1 Implications for IT Strategy Planners and Solution Architects
in the Oil & Gas Industry
IT strategy planners and solutions architects should understand the strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats (SWOT) of new technology that is considered for adoption in a
given context. Our key ﬁndings can be used as input to a SWOT-analysis.
Strengths: From key ﬁnding 5 and 9 we have seen that both academics and practitioners
anticipate FIM to improve usability related to access control solutions. This has to do
with the single-sign-on feature, which allows end users a more seamless workﬂow with-
out having to type in a username and password for each service or information request.
Academics and practitioners also agree that FIM can lead to better protection. The aca-
demics expect fewer passwords to be written down on paper, and that users should be able
to select stronger passwords, while the practitioners conﬁrm the situation that the number
of usernames and passwords that they must remember is so high that they currently write
them down in books.
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Through key ﬁnding 6 and key ﬁnding 9 we have also seen similar expectations between
the academic community and industry representatives. Academics have argued that FIM
will reduce administrative cost related to identity management. The practitioners share
this view, and the example (from key ﬁnding 11) where one company has 20.000 employ-
ees, but administers more than 70.000 user accounts is illustrative in this regard. With
such a situation one can also understand the academics and the practitioners when they
expect improved quality in the recorded identity attributes. It is easier for the employer
to catch changes related to the identity attributes of an employee than it is for an external
company.
Academic literature explains that service providers can experience reduced complexity
since identity management can be outsourced to a third party (key ﬁnding 6). Service
providers can then focus on the development of functional aspects of the service. The
practitioners did not talk about outsourcing of identity management as mechanism to re-
duce complexity, however, they mentioned outsourcing of IdM as a mechanism to estab-
lish trust related to the identity federation (key ﬁnding 10). Due to the collaborative, but
at the same time competitive nature of the oil and gas industry (key ﬁnding 11) it would
be easier to trust identity management to an external third party.
In key ﬁnding 5 academics say that improved end user privacy is one of the expected
beneﬁts related to FIM. One of the practitioners mentioned that FIM will facilitate system
audits as every user is likely to access systems by means of personal user accounts, which
is in contrast to todays’ situation where common service accounts are used for many of
the production systems (key ﬁnding 9). In Paper 5 we claim that although some users
might be concerned about privacy aspects of FIM, we believe that the ability to perform
audits will trump privacy on enterprise systems.
Weaknesses: In key ﬁnding 4 we claim that there is little empirical evidence related to
adoption of FIM in industrial contexts. Consequently, decisions to adopt FIM will be
made based on expert opinions, or the voice of FIM manufacturers’ market divisions,
rather than data from rigorous and unbiased research.
It is important to be aware of interoperability issues related to new technology, and espe-
cially technology that is meant to facilitate collaboration between organizations. Through
key ﬁnding 7 and key ﬁnding 10 we found that both academics and practitioners foresee
challenges related to interoperability. Different companies may adhere to different stan-
dards and tools for federated identity management in inter-organizational collaborations,
and FIM vendors applying the same standard may utilize different protocol options that
may prevent their solutions from co-existence within the same federation. The practi-
tioners also add that existing services must be integrated with the FIM solutions, but that
smaller product vendors might not have the competency of economic baseline to make
these integrations. Further, both academics and practitioners emphasize the need to agree
on the semantic meaning of identity attributes within the identity federation.
Academics and practitioners are also aware that the adoption of FIM is associated with
high expenses related to investment in new technology and integration efforts (key ﬁnding
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8 and 10). Will the investments be a result of a Dutch treat within the industry? Will
international companies be willing to make major investments in FIM technology due to
possible demands from their Norwegian partners? Within the industry it is clear that there
must be agreements on who is responsible for the cost.
In key ﬁnding 10 our practitioners question whether the introduction of FIM will result
in less administrative overhead, and argue that they need strict control on who has access
to what. The burden of access control will not be less with FIM, they claim. Although
this is most likely true, it also show that some of the practitioners confuse identity man-
agement with authorization, and that the concept of separating identity management from
authorization is new in this domain. The knowledge about the technology may not be
sufﬁcient among all stakeholders to take informed decisions. This is also related to key
ﬁnding 11, where we show that the collaborative picture is complex, and where the prac-
titioners themselves question whether the industry is mature enough to adopt new identity
management solutions to facilitate identity federations.
Opportunities: Academics expect FIM to facilitate cooperation among service providers,
and that seamless service access across company boundaries may be a result (key ﬁnding
6). Cooperation is also important for the practitioners. Employees in the oil and gas in-
dustry will be able to work more efﬁciently if they meet the same access control solutions
in each company (key ﬁnding 9). In Paper 5 we also explained that an onshore worker
may be responsible for controlling several offshore facilities, and that this person needs
to visit 15 to 20 different systems per day. Others might need to visit up to ﬁve different
systems with separate logins to create production reports. FIM may lead to improved
usability for these people, but also make their working day more efﬁcient, and thus cost
efﬁcient. Key ﬁnding 11 shows that co-workers borrow each other’s access credentials
from time to time. The practitioners have explained that one of the reasons for this can
be that they have forgotten their infrequently used password used to access external col-
laborator’s services. It might be time consuming to wait for the bureaucratic process of
resetting the password. With FIM, workers will use of their everyday credential to access
all services. The chance of forgetting credentials will be limited, the inefﬁcient waiting
time for credential reset will be reduced, and the chance that credentials are borrowed
from a co-worker, against company security policies, may be eliminated.
Key ﬁnding 3 shows the importance of ensuring a high quality in all parts of the identity
management process. The whole identity management process may be at risk if one of the
activities is ﬂawed or insufﬁcient. This again may leave valuable company assets at risk.
FIM adds to this challenge in that weaknesses in one company’s IdM lifecycle affects the
security level of collaborators. This, however, can also be seen as an opportunity. FIM
will require common policies for identity management to be developed within the feder-
ation. As such, the industry at large can use the introduction of FIM to clean up identity
management processes and agree upon shared IdM requirements. "The contractors will
never be able to handle the processes behind federation." (key ﬁnding 10) was one of
the replies from an operator representative. Common policies for FIM may contribute to
improved trust since all partners involved in the federation must adhere to them.
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Threats: The concept of federated identity management involves sharing of identity data
across company boundaries. Consequently, identity data will also be transferred outside
the traditional defence mechanisms of a company, including the company ﬁrewall. The
number of stakeholders with the means and motive to intercept and analyze the trafﬁc,
including identity data, will increase signiﬁcantly. Key ﬁnding 1 and 2 clearly show
that poorly implemented FIM solutions will affect the security level negatively. Identity
assertions with insufﬁcient protection, for instance, may allow adversaries to circumvent
authentication procedures through, e.g., replay attacks) or elevate privileges, e.g., by mod-
ifying identity attributes.
Liability issues are pointed to by academics as one of the challenges regarding FIM (key
ﬁnding 8), and they claim that federations may span across organizations with different
internal rules and regulations and across jurisdictional borders, both national and interna-
tional. Most of the companies within the oil and gas industry, operating on the Norwegian
continental shelf, are multinational and have global operations. One of our practitioners
stated: "Today, we have a responsibility to protect our customers’ data, and it is an enor-
mous responsibility for us to ensure that it is not being misused." In paper 5 we question
whether collaboration partners are wiling to assume even more risk. Are they willing to
accept liability for downtime on production facilities caused by employees’ inability to
access and monitor, for example, safety-critical processes, due to trouble with their inter-
nal identity management solutions? Further, what happens if unintended error occurs due
to extended access based on FIM, and what happens if a contractor identity is stolen and
used to access resources at a collaboration partner? Questions regarding liability must be
properly discussed.
Both academics and practitioners are concerned about security issues related to use of
federated identity management (key ﬁnding 8 and 10). Identity theft and impersonation
attacks based on stolen identities are highlighted by the academics, and the use of iden-
tity assertions, e.g. to achieve cross-domain single-sign-on contributes to these threats.
Message security and proper use of integrity and conﬁdentiality protection is essential.
The reality of the academics’ concerns is illustrated through Paper 1 (key ﬁnding 1 and
2). The practitioners also mention security issues as a major concern (key ﬁnding 10).
They feel that the use of FIM blurs the barriers between existing security domains, and
their biggest fear is that someone unauthorized can get access to and control a production
process. They point to the risk of identity theft, and also that the risk of unintended errors,
which might cause consequences outside their company’s premises. The introduction of
poorly implemented identity management solutions will put a company’s (or all compa-
nies within a federation’s) assets at risk. The security speciﬁcations of the IdM product
being evaluated for purchase should be studied, and one should request information about
how the product was developed. Only IdM manufacturers that can prove their security
awareness through the whole development lifecycle should be considered.
Last, trust issues must be given attention before one selects to adopt the technology (key
ﬁnding 8 and 10). The practitioners explain a situation where companies can collaborate
on one project, but compete in others. It is essential that only information relevant for a
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given collaboration is available. Companies must trust the technology, and they must trust
that collaborators in the identity federation maintain a high quality on their identity man-
agement processes. An expression such as "The contractors will never be able to handle
the processes behind federation" indicates that introduction of FIM is not an overnight
work task.
5.1.2 Implications for the Research Community
First, this work has provided insight into the Norwegian oil and gas industry, and their
perception of FIM technology, through empirical research. The complexity of the industry
and current security challenges related to identity management and access control has
also been identiﬁed through Paper 5 and 6. In light of Hevner and March’s design science
framework [35], this contributes to building essential knowledge about an environment
where FIM can be utilized in the future, and thus can be used to improve the relevance of
research initiatives towards this domain.
Second, this work has identiﬁed that there is little focus on empirical research within the
federated identity management community. Hevner and March [35] state that signiﬁcant
progress within a research ﬁeld1 will only occur when there is a balance between tradi-
tional design science and empirical research. A combination between the two is essential
to improve relevance and rigor of the research. The research community should con-
tinue to develop novel security technologies, but at the same time spend more effort on
empirical evaluations of their innovations.
Third, the last decade’s research on identity management and especially federated identity
management has clearly shown the beneﬁts of separating identity management from au-
thorization management, and reduce the coupling between these and the applications to be
access protected. As we indicate in key ﬁnding 10, however, the industry still seems to be
inﬂuenced by the "old" tradition of bundling applications with a combined authentication
and authorization mechanism. The research community should join efforts to develop
communication models to explain the beneﬁts of separating identity management from
authorization management.
5.1.3 Implications for IdM Developers and Product Manufacturers
Through Key ﬁnding 1 and Key ﬁnding 2 we have highlighted some of the difﬁculties of
developing secure identity management solutions. A secure development strategy should
be in place for the realization of the technical platform. Security should be an inherent
part of all software development phases, from requirements speciﬁcation, though design,
implementation and testing. Paper 1 gave examples of what can happen if the implemen-
tation fails.
1their focus is on information systems
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Key ﬁnding 7 is also important for developers and manufacturers of IdM solutions, es-
pecially those who aim for development of solutions for federated identity management.
Most inter-organizational collaboration arenas are heterogeneous in nature. There will
be variations in operating systems, ofﬁce tools, collaboration software, in-house systems,
out-sourced systems, cloud services and so on and so forth - all of which must be in-
tegrated with the various (federated) identity management solutions that are being used
by each collaborating partner. IdM manufacturers must take interoperability issues into
account. They must be willing to adhere to open standards and be open on the protocol
options they use. They must not fall into temptation of implementing some conformance
variations that lead to vendor lock-in and difﬁculties for their customers to realize new
identity federations and IT-based business collaborations with new partners.
Key ﬁnding 10 documents some of the challenges the oil & gas industry sees in relation
to adoption of FIM, and the concerns they have related to this concept. The practitioners
conﬁrm a complex IT environment, and the need for standardized and interoperable solu-
tions. However, maybe the most important point for developers and manufacturers to be
aware of is the industry’s fear that FIM will negatively affect the security level in that they
loose control of who can access what. The product manufacturers’ sales departments must
be explicit about the differences between identity management and access management,
and that allowing an external entity control of the identity management process does not
reduce their ability to control access with the same granularity as today.
Finally, Key ﬁnding 10 includes the hint of a new business strategy for IdM product man-
ufacturers. Develop an identity management service that can act as a trusted identity
provider within the oil & gas industry. As one of our interviewees stated: "I have some
trouble imagining that access to external resources can be given if [the identity manage-
ment process] is to be handled within each company. I feel that it has to be organized by
a common entity."
5.2 Adoption of FIM in the Oil & Gas Industry
In Paper 5 we ask the question: Are identity federations attractive for the industry? To
support the answer of this question we turn to Roger’s theory on Diffusion of Innovations
[65], and especially his focus on "the perceived attributes of innovations". These attributes
are: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability.
The relative advantage of an innovation is one of the strongest predictors of its adoption
rate [65]. Our study shows that there are perceived advantages of FIM adoption for all
collaborators in the Norwegian oil and gas industry (key ﬁnding 5 and 6), but that some
of these are offset by either compatibility issues or increased complexity (key ﬁnding 7
and 8). At the same time, there are examples in which FIM is being tested in the industry,
and from our discussions on organizational maturity, we see that there is a willingness to
proceed.
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FIM security technology interferes with, but isn’t a part of, a primary business process.
It’s a preventive innovation, which according to Rogers, "has a particularly slow rate of
adoption because individuals have difﬁculties in perceiving its relative advantage" [65].
So, maybe it’s not strange that the adoption process is slow in the industry. Our ﬁndings
are in line with Smith’s claim that FIM adoption will be an evolution, rather than an
overnight revolution [74].
Even though we can not give a short answer to the slow adoption rates of FIM there are
three aspects that are appropriate to highlight: trust, understanding of the FIM concept and
development support for FIM. Trust is a complex topic and a fundamental concept under-
lying FIM [74]. Paper 5 (and key ﬁnding 10), document evidence that the needed trust
level among collaborators may not be sufﬁcient to establish identity federations within
the Norwegian oil and gas industry at current time. As an example, our informants in
the case study questioned whether their collaborators could handle the processes behind
FIM, and whether FIM technology could sufﬁciently be used as part of the asset protection
strategy in the collaborative, but competitive industrial environment. We have also docu-
mented that there may be confusion within the industry regarding the understanding of the
FIM concept and the possibility to separate identity management, including authentication
mechanisms from authorization management. Challenges related to understanding of the
FIM concept may inﬂuence negatively on the trust level associated with the technology,
and the industry’s willingness to rely on it. The industry participants fear that they will
loose control over ’who has access to what’ within the FIM collaboration, and such skep-
ticism must be reduced to facilitate FIM adoption. Last, we documented the skepticism
the industry has in the maturity of the FIM technology in that some of our interviewees are
concerned about the complexity involved in developing new FIM solutions with existing
technology. Until the last few years this has been a legitimate concern. The starting point
for building a FIM solution would be to develop it from scratch with standards speciﬁca-
tions, such as SAML2.0 as input. The few last years, however, we have seen an increasing
number of maturing solutions to build FIM systems provided by large software compa-
nies, such as Microsoft. Active Directory Federation Services is an identity federation
solution that can be integrated with existing user directories within an organization, and
.NET frameworks2 provide development support through application programmer inter-
faces (API’s) speciﬁcally created for the purpose of developing FIM solutions. Mature
identity assurance frameworks are also essential in supporting development of FIM so-
lutions at a conceptual level. Common policies and governance mechanisms must be in
place within a FIM collaboration to improve the collaborators trust in each others identity
management processes.
Our interviews paint a picture of a complex industrial IT landscape, currently lacking the
maturity level necessary to implement a global, ubiquitous FIM solution. There was also
skepticism among interviewees as to whether systems of different criticality should be
connected at all, now or in the future. The vision of a ubiquitous FIM solution that inte-
grates with all systems might be too ambitious and certainly conﬂicts with Ross Ander-
2e.g. Windows Identity Foundation http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/aa570351.aspx
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son’s observation that there are always systems that don’t ﬁt"[16]. However, we believe
that the broader industrial audience will adopt some form of federated identity manage-
ment sooner or later. The fact that they’ve started experiments with the technology is a
good indication, and the perceived beneﬁts are clear. The challenges are complex, but
being aware of them will stimulate discussions among collaborators so that palatable so-
lutions can be found.
5.3 Limitations
This research is not without limitations. In the following we emphasize the most impor-
tant limitations, which have an inﬂuence on the interpretation of the results presented in
this dissertation.
In Study 1 we present experiences from the security testing of a prototype application that
was developed as part of a research project, and whose purpose was not primarily aimed at
solving security challenges. Our ﬁndings can as such not be generalized to development
projects with a purpose to deliver solutions for the commercial market. However, the
experiences and results we present indicate potential consequences of developing identity
management solutions containing security vulnerabilities and ﬂaws. History has shown
that people3 are creative, and that they will try to ﬁnd software vulnerabilities to achieve
their goals, not matter how banal or complex the vulnerabilities are. Identity theft, replay
attacks using identity assertions, and elevation of privileges are examples of sub-goals
attackers would like to achieve in order to reach their ﬁnal target, which for instance may
be a company’s digital assets. Our results exempliﬁes unwanted situations, and must not
be used as evidence that existing identity management solutions are troubled with security
vulnerabilities and ﬂaws.
Generalization, or external validity, is also an issue for Review 2 where we studied the
academics’ view of the beneﬁts and challenges of federated identity management. The
purpose of this thesis is to gain understanding regarding the concept of FIM from an
industrial viewpoint. In our review work, however, we did not evaluate the context, which
academics made their statements based on. Most studies involved in the review describe
aspects of FIM within an Internet-based scenario where service providers on the open
Internet may beneﬁt from FIM technology. Few, however discuss FIM in an industrial
context where the goal of the FIM solution is to facilitate secure sharing of sensitive
company owned assets. Consequently, one can not guarantee that the results from the
review are applicable within the industrial case. In section 5.1.1, we use the results from
Review 2 (Paper 3 and 4) and apply them in a SWOT analysis intended for use by strategy
planners or solutions architects within the industry. They, in particular, need to be aware
of this limitation. However, we also include the practitioners’ perceptions in the SWOT
analysis, and a comparison show that both academics and practitioners share perception
of the FIM technology in many areas.
3i.e. hackers, attackers, industrial spies or any other actor with bad intentions
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In Study 2 we carried out a case study based on semi-structured interviews. The goal
of the study was to collect practitioners perception of the FIM technology. Since the
FIM technology has not been widely adopted in the industry yet, their statements will be
colored by previous experiences with similar technology used in other domains, such as
experiences with use of the government provided FIM solution presented in section 2.6,
or FIM solutions offered by a social media providers. Further, there is a risk of bias in the
data collection and the analysis phase. This is related to the study’s construct validity. Yin
[80] states that multiple sources of evidence should be used in case studies to strengthen
the evidence, otherwise there is a risk of subjective judgements. Our study use interviews
as the sole source of information. This, however, was the only solution to collect data
about a technology that has not yet been utilized. Further, one researcher alone was re-
sponsible for the data analysis. This is also a weakness that may color the results. The
co-author of paper 5, however, participated in the development of the research strategy,
including deﬁnition of research questions and development of the interview guide. Fur-
ther, he commented on and criticized the results prior to publication is an effort to avoid
potential observer bias.
We do not make claims that our results from Study 2 can be generalized outside the
context of the Norwegian Oil & Gas Industry. Our effort is focused on providing a richer
insight into this domain. This industry may share characteristics with other industries,
but new research efforts should be made to see if our results are applicable to a wider
audience.
Our original plan for this research work was to carry out multiple iterations of the design
science approach. Lack of existing knowledge related to adoption of FIM in industry,
together with lack of insight in the complex industrial environment, however, made us
deviate from this plan. Still, it is a limitation of this study that it measures perception of
the FIM technology, and not real world experiences with its adoption and use.
5.4 Recommendations for Future Work
Through this work we have collected information that can be used as input to the develop-
ment of a federated identity management speciﬁcation4 for the Norwegian oil and gas in-
dustry. The next step in a design science approach would be to evaluate this speciﬁcation,
for instance through focus groups to get the practitioners’ feedback before a prototype
FIM solution is built. This FIM solution should be integrated with a service of low crit-
icality, but which is frequently used within the production environment by several of the
collaboration partners within the industry. This should ease on our interviewees’ skepti-
cism that FIM will blur the security boundaries between systems of different criticality. A
case study or ethnographic study could be designed in this regard; ﬁrst to document im-
plementation challenges in an operational environment, and then to obtain empirical data
on the practitioners’ perception of real use of FIM technology. The approach would also
4which should satisfy Hevner and March’s requirements for relevance in the design science approach
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facilitate collection of data from several data sources, such as interviews, usage logs, help
desk request regarding user administration, and written agreement between the federation
partners. Such a study would provide invaluable empirical results back to the research
community. This strategy is in line with our recommendations on how to facilitate adop-
tion of FIM in Paper 6, and would give real world data on the relative advantage of FIM,
its compatibility with existing practices within the oil and gas industry, and allow the in-
dustry to test FIM solutions in small scale (trialability) before deploying FIM in a wider
context5.
Another natural progress in the research on FIM would be to design case studies to collect
empirical data related to identity federations that already have been implemented. In sec-
tion 2.6 we gave a few examples of existing solutions within the Norwegian government
and educational sector. Research should be carried out to learn what worked, and what
did not. Retrospects of implementation projects should be carried out to generate good
practice guides on how to organize FIM implementation projects.
Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen [73] carried out a comprehensive review of existing aca-
demic literature on the information security topics: access to information systems, secure
communication, security management and development of secure information systems.
They split the research into technical, conceptual and organizational contributions. Their
ﬁndings suggest a bias towards technical research. Further, they found that most aca-
demics within this ﬁeld lean towards mathematical approaches (including logic) and con-
ceptual analysis to evaluate their research. Within the category organizational research
they found the prevailing research approaches to be conceptual analysis and empirical
research. However, they claim, the amount of empirical research is sparse. Labunets [53]
recognize the lack of empirical research as a challenge within the information security re-
search community, and argue that the lack of empirical validation is a drawback for both
practitioners and researcher. Practitioners will not be able to take informed decisions as
to which security technique/method/tool to use and which is the better for their context,
and researchers will not gain sufﬁcient knowledge to understand how their research re-
sults can be improved to meet industry expectations. The scarcity of empirical research
on information security, and more speciﬁcally model driven development and federated
identity management is also conﬁrmed by the two reviews being part of this thesis (doc-
umented in Paper 2 [45], Paper 3 [43] and Paper 4 [42]). From this we can deduce that
information security is a research ﬁeld where the use of empirical research methods is
still in its infancy. In Paper 6 we argue that there is a need for further research on the
adoption of security technology in general, and especially that empirical data should be
collected, both from organizations that have adopted a technology and those that have not.
Our claim is that a thorough understanding of the factors inﬂuencing adoption can help
us target development and deployment efforts towards the speciﬁc factors that are most
challenging.
There is, however, an increasing awareness about the need for empirical research within
5relative advantage, compatibility and trialability are related to Roger’s theory on Diffusion of Innova-
tions [65]
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the academic information security community. This is exempliﬁed by two panel discus-
sions from the last few years’ international information security conferences. Niekerk and
colleagues [59] held a panel on the topic at the 25th IFIP TC 11 International Information
Security Conference (IFIP SEC) 2010 and the 7th International Conference on Availabil-
ity, Reliability and Security (ARES) 20126 included a panel on the subject, moderated by
Shari Lawrence Pﬂeeger.
We acknowledge that it is difﬁcult to apply research methods and instruments, including
those designed for empirical research, that are not speciﬁcally designed to do research on
information security topics. Nyre and Jaatun’s [60] research on adoption of security tech-
nology (usage control) in industry is a good example that existing research instruments on
technology adoption can not automatically be applied to the information security domain.
Instead, a number of existing theories must be combined and tailored to ﬁt adoption of
non-functional technologies such as security technologies. The more empirical research
the information security community carries out, the more familiar we become with the
methods, and the better we as community can design our (hopefully reusable) research
instruments. This is not to say that empirical approaches are better than others, as also
emphasized by Hevner and March [35]; "signiﬁcant progress in information systems re-
search will only occur when the discipline as a whole recognizes and appreciates the
beneﬁts of both paradigms", they claim. This PhD thesis contributes with empirical re-
search to the information security community in an attempt to even the balance between
technical and empirical research contributions to federated identity management.
6http://www.ares-conference.eu/ares2012/
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis has addressed challenges in developing secure identity management solutions
for distributed service platforms, presented empirical evidence on development and adop-
tion of federated identity management (FIM) in industry, and discussed beneﬁts and chal-
lenges related to FIM.
First, through our ﬁndings we have seen the importance of being aware of security is-
sues in all phases of the software development lifecycle. Software in general is burdened
with security bugs and ﬂaws. Unfortunately, this is also true for security software such as
solutions for federated identity management. Our research shows examples on how iden-
tity management solutions with vulnerabilities, and especially poorly protected identity
assertions in distributed (or federated) environments can be exploited in several different
ways. Further, we have documented that secure identity management is more than secure
technology. During technology development one must consider all phases of the identity
management lifecycle to ensure that the technology provides secure interfaces and secure
mechanisms to support the identity management activities. However, it is also important
to focus on the organizational identity management processes to make sure these are of
high quality, and mitigate threats targeted at human interactions. Secure identity man-
agement technology does not eliminate challenges related to human errors and ﬂawed
processes.
Second, we have seen that there is little empirical evidence on the development and adop-
tion of FIM in industry. The decision to adopt FIM in inter-organizational industrial
environments, such as the Norwegian oil and gas industry must therefore be based on
perception of the technology, rather than documented evidence. There exit examples of
successful FIM deployments, e.g. in government sectors and in educational sectors, as
well as examples from the social media services on the Internet. Unbiased research on
these examples would be appreciated, in order to build new solutions based on exist-
ing knowledge. Even though this thesis provides insight into industrial expectations and
needs based on empirical research, it is limited to practitioners’ perception of a technology
that has not yet been adopted in their working environment. More research is needed to
document the impact of large-scale deployments of FIM in inter-organizational contexts.
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Finally, we have documented the beneﬁts and challenges related to FIM from the perspec-
tive of the academic community and the Norwegian oil and gas industry. In Paper 5 [44]
we state that our interviews with industry practitioners reveal that some of FIM’s bene-
ﬁts are offset by its challenges, we also claim that a vision of a ubiquitous FIM solution
covering all services within the Norwegian oil and gas industry might be too ambitious.
We agree with the skepticism of our interviewees who fear a too tight connection between
systems of different criticality. Still, we believe that the broader industrial audience will
adopt some form of federated identity management sooner or later. The challenges are
complex, but being aware of them will stimulate discussions among collaborators so that
palatable solutions can be found.
In Paper 6 [46] we took a deeper look at factors affecting adoption of security technol-
ogy, including FIM. In this paper we state that the adoption rate of FIM has been slower
than expected by the academic community. Further, we conclude that there are a number
of factors affecting technology adoption involving the context in which the technology
is placed. We have not been able to identify a short answer to why the adoption rate
remains low, but we believe that there are many ways in which it can be improved. We
also advocate demonstrating how the technologies constitute an evolution of the access
control system, rather than a revolution. We believe that a continuation of the original
design science approach selected for this PhD project would be a good approach for this
purpose. Through this thesis we have provided a knowledge base that should be used in
the development of a FIM architecture tailored for the oil and gas industry, and to increase
the relevance of future FIM prototypes built through research initiatives to support a soft
and smooth transition from current identity management solutions to future solutions sup-
porting identity federations.
Identity management is a fundamental prerequisite to ensure information security. Our
research has shown that the Norwegian oil and gas industry experiences challenges with
current identity management practices. The time is ripe reconsideration of existing prac-
tices and introduction of new solutions.
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Abstract 
Service Oriented Architectures are gaining popularity, and are used to realise corporate 
networks, including healthcare systems. This paper summarises the security standards that 
are defined for web services, which are the building blocks used for most SOA systems, 
and security challenges related to developing such systems. Further, a case study is 
presented and the results related to the security evaluation of this case are given. The 
security evaluation was performed using grey-box testing techniques on a prototype 
implementation of a web services based healthcare platform. The tests revealed severe 
security weaknesses in the platform. The experiences presented in this paper illustrate some 
of the complexity of developing secure SOA-based systems, and show the importance of 
having a focus on security throughout the entire software development lifecycle. 
1. Introduction 
Service Oriented Architectures (SOA) are gaining popularity and in a 2009 survey 
performed by Computer Economics [1], 58% of the responding organisations said they 
were making a transition to the service oriented model. Also, healthcare organisations 
are considering service orientation. One example of such is the National ICT, a 
Norwegian institution coordinating ICT initiatives in the specialised health services, 
who suggest SOA as a means to achieve a common platform for those services [2]. New 
technologies and new concepts often introduces new security concerns, and as pointed 
out by Epstein et al. [3] this is also true for systems built after the principles of SOA.  
 
Healthcare systems are subject to extensive formal regulations concerning the security 
(i.e. confidentiality, integrity and availability) of data [4], and studies show that privacy 
related personal health information is important. In a Norwegian study [6], a total of 
85% replied that they feel protection of personal health information is important to 
them, and a nationwide U.S. survey [7] showed that 70% percent said they were 
concerned that personal information could be leaked from electronic medical records 
because of weak security. 
 
The MPOWER project1 is a research project funded by the European Commission, with 
the objective to develop a home care service platform. The platform is based on SOA 
principles and realised through web services. Therefore, the security concerns and 
requirements related to both SOA and health care systems apply. In this paper we use 
the MPOWER platform as a case study to illustrate a selection of security challenges 
faced when developing secure web service-based SOA systems, and discuss how to 
mitigate these threats.  
2. Web service security 
The following sections give an overview of security standards that are of relevance for 
the development of secure web service-based systems, and challenges faced when 
implementing such systems.   
                                                 
1 sourceforge.net/projects/free-mpower/ 
The Norwegian Information Security Conference (NISK) 2009 185
Security standards 
Security must be built in as an inherent part of a secure service platform. However, the 
original standards used to define Web Services, i.e. XML, HTTP, WSDL, SOAP and 
UDDI do not originally address security issues; they were designed to provide 
connectivity [8]. Consequently, various organisations have come up with a number of 
security standards to meet prevalent security challenges.   
 
Some of the standards are particularly interesting for achieving message level security 
for Web Services: XML-encryption [9] can be used to achieve confidentiality protection, 
while XML-signature [10] can be used for creation of digital signatures, and thus 
integrity protection. Both XML documents as whole and single XML elements can be 
secured by means of these two. The WS-Security standard [11] specifies a set of 
extensions to the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) to help building secure Web 
Services. This standard defines three main mechanisms: methods for providing message 
integrity, methods for providing message confidentiality and descriptions of how 
security tokens can be included in SOAP messages [12]. Confidentiality and integrity 
are achieved by means of XML-encryption and XML-signature respectively. WS-
SecureConversation [13] is a standard defining extensions to the WS-Security standard, 
and provides a framework for establishing and sharing security contexts, as well as 
session key derivation. While the WS-Security authentication model is focused on 
message authentication, WS-SecureConversation is aiming at establishing a security 
context between two endpoints. Thus, a series of messages can be authenticated, which 
increases the performance and efficiency of the security mechanisms. 
  
With respect to access control there are other web service security standards that are of 
interest. SAML [14] is an acronym for Security Assertion Markup Language and is a 
standard, that is “…an XML based framework for communicating user information, 
entitlements, and attribute information” [15]. SAML assertions can be issued by 
identity authorities and then used e.g to uniquely identify a service requester in a trusted 
manner. SAML can be used for authorisation purposes, and thus to achieve single-sign-
on (SSO) [16] in a web service environments. To define service level authorisation and 
to implement a security policy for authorisation purposes XACML [17] can be utilised.  
 
Trust is an important interoperability issue, and to allow communication between 
services and actors from different trust domains WS-Trust [18], defines extensions to 
WS-Security. These extensions enable issuance and exchange of trusted security tokens, 
and additionally the standard defines procedures to broker trust relationships between 
different trust domains to allow trusted SOAP message exchange.  
 
The implementation of Public Key Infrastructures is described by O’Neill et al [19] to 
be complex, and the management may be difficult. XML Key Management Specification 
(XKMS) [20] specifies protocols for distributing and registering public keys. The 
purpose of XKMS is to transfer this complexity to specific, more easily managed 
services that specialise in PKI management.  
 
SSL [21] and TLS [22] are point-to-point protocols used to provide confidentiality and 
integrity protection of data between two communicating entities. An initial handshake 
protocol between the two entities is used to negotiate security context, such as 
cryptographic algorithm and establishment of a common symmetric key. While all the 
above mentioned protocols operate at the application layer to support secure Web 
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Services and secure Web Service communication, SSL/TLS both operate at the 
transport layer2. That is why these protocols cannot provide end-to-end security through 
intermediary nodes in web service environments. However, web service environments 
can benefit from SSL/TLS if secure communication is to be achieved between two 
entities with direct communication.  
Security challenges 
Web Service infrastructures introduce new threats to web-based applications as well as 
new challenges when it comes to securing them [19] [23] [24] [25]. Although we 
acknowledge that general threats to web applications, such as the OWASP top ten list3, 
also apply to web services, we restrict our study to only include threats that are 
characteristic of web services. In this paper we therefore focus on threats and challenges 
stemming from firewall traversals, publicly accessible business logic, identity 
management and end-to-end security.  
 
Traditional network firewalls operate at the network and transport layer and will not be 
able to discover threats inside the application layer SOAP messages sent to and from a 
web service’s WSDL interface. Consequently, the application’s attack surface is 
expanded from the user interface alone, to also include the service interfaces for each 
service/module of the application. 
 
The fact that business logic becomes publicly accessible is seen as a challenge. A 
service’s WSDL schema defines how to use and interact with the given web service. 
Yunus and Mallal [24] explains that attackers gain detailed and valuable knowledge of 
how to attack applications through these schemas. The verbose information given by the 
WSDL interfaces simplifies an adversaries’ process of identifying platform 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Vorobiev and Han [23] also mention this verbosity as a 
challenge, and that the detailed information about available functions and function 
parameters easily can be misused. 
 
Identity management is described by O’Neill et al [19] as yet another challenge in 
Web Service environments. In traditional server-client architectures there is a direct link 
between users and the web applications. To take the SSL/TLS authentication procedure 
as an example, users can authenticate directly towards the web application, e.g., by use 
of certificates. However, in web service environments users will interact through web 
portals, which are responsible for communicating with the web services on users’ 
behalf. This implies challenges related to how provider services can trust that they admit 
access to authorised users. User information must be passed between services, and 
possibly even through a chain of intermediary services in a secure fashion to allow the 
final provider service to make the correct authorisation decisions. Ideally, a user should 
only need to authenticate to the system once, and not for each service he wants to 
connect to.  
 
Transport layer security mechanisms such as TLS or SSL are commonly used to provide 
data integrity and confidentiality between to communicating entities. The problem 
arises when the concept of intermediary nodes are introduced. The point-to-point 
principle implies that messages have to be decrypted at the intermediary node and then 
                                                 
2 Referred  to the OSI model 
3 OWASP top 10: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project 
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re-encrypted before it is forwarded to the final destination. This model cannot guarantee 
that the intermediary service does not manipulate the data either intentionally or 
unintentionally, thus end-to-end security is not ensured. This limitation is recognised 
by Anzböck and Dustdar [26], among others, who argue that the security needs to be 
integrated in web services to provide a necessary level of security for end-to-end 
transmission of messages. 
3. The test case 
In this section we will present how the MPOWER authentication and authorisation 
procedures were specified before the implementation started. In the following figures, 
the participants in the sequence diagrams represent individual web services.  
 
Application Authentication
Service
Token
Management
Service
al t 
[successful login]
[failed  login]
login(credentials)
validateLogin()
issueToken()
securityToken(securityToken)
securityToken(securityToken)
invalidLogin()
redirectToLoginPage()
 
Figure 1: Specified authentication procedure 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the authentication procedure designed for the MPOWER middleware 
platform. As the message sequence chart illustrates, all users have to perform an initial 
login before MPOWER services can be utilised (via an end-user application). The 
authentication process is performed as follows: Users and user sessions are handled by 
the applications tailored to use the MPOWER platform. These applications forward 
login requests from users to the authentications service. If the validation process accepts 
the authentication request, a security token is issued. The Authentication service calls 
the Token Management service, which generates and digitally signs the security token. 
The security token is then sent back to the user via the Authentication service. Once the 
user is authenticated she can use the security token as proof of identity to other services. 
 
The issuance of a security token as described is meant to provide a single-sign-on 
solution. The security token is used as a session identifier, and a unique identification of 
the user. By including it in service requests, MPOWER services are able to validate the 
authenticity of the requesting actor without having to perform the authentication 
procedure for each new request. The lack of a security token indicates that the user is 
not authenticated and should not be given access to MPOWER services’ resources. The 
validity of the security token should be time limited to mitigate risks of unauthorised 
use if it is stolen or somehow leaked to a malign third party. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the authorisation procedure at the service level. The principle is 
adapted from the OASIS SAML SSO profile [16]. The illustration is based on the 
assumption that a user is previously logged in and has a valid security token. The 
following describes the illustrated authorisation process: A user tries to access an 
MPOWER middleware service via an application, which sends a service request, 
including the security token. The middleware service needs to validate whether the user 
is authorised to access the requested service and operation or not before access is 
granted. An isAuthorised request including the security token, service name and 
operation is sent from the middleware service to the Authorisation service. The security 
token identifies the requesting user, and the roles she holds. It must therefore be 
checked for validity before further authorisation decisions can be made. An isValid 
request is sent to the Token Management service to perform this validation. The token’s 
expiry date and its digital signature are central in this validation procedure. If the token 
validation is successful, the Authorisation service will be notified and then contact the 
Access Management service to get the access policy defined for the role/s the requesting 
user holds. Based on the retrieved access policy the Authorisation service checks the 
permissions for the relevant role/s and performs a permission check that can result in 
two alternatives: A) Either the request is accepted, and the Authorisation service grants 
access and notifies the middleware service which again provides the requested content 
to the application, or B) the request is denied, and the Authorisation service notifies the 
middleware service of the denied access which sends an access denied message back to 
the user. A failed token validation either means that a security token was not presented, 
or that the presented security token was not valid. In either way, the Authorisation 
service notifies the user via the middleware service and presents a message saying that 
token validation failed (or that a new login is required). 
 
Application Access
Management
Service
Token
Management
Service
Authorisation
Service
Middleware
Service
al t 
[sucessful toke n validation ]
[failed token  validation]
al t 
[permission  check OK]
[permission  check NOK]
requestService(securityToken)
isAuthorised(securityToken, etc.)
isValid(securityToken)
getAccessProfile()
checkPermissions()
accessGranted()
requestedInformation()
accessDenied()
msg("You do not have the required permissions.")
tokenValidationFailed()
msg("No val id token presented")
redirectToLoginPage()
 
Figure 2: Specified authorisation procedure 
Testing methodology 
A security assessment of the service platform was performed using grey-box testing 
[27], which is a combination of pure interface testing (black-box) and software model 
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testing (white-box). That is, we have used our knowledge of the software model and 
implementation to find vulnerabilities and then attempted interface testing based on this 
knowledge. Our tests do not cover every aspect of the system and were not intended for 
validation of correct behaviour. Our aim was to review how security was handled on a 
basic level; hence the more advanced test procedures have been left out. 
 
The server providing all web services was running the Ubuntu Linux operating system 
and GlassFish application server4. On the client side we developed our own Python 
scripts and Java classes for SOAP message generation and sending, while the 
Wireshark5 network protocol analyser was used for sniffing and analysing transmitted 
SOAP messages 
 
Although the prototype implementation includes the security services that were 
specified in the design, several vital features have been left out. In this section we point 
at some of the problems of the current implementation, while acknowledging that it is 
merely a prototype and not an operational system. 
Security testing 
In this section we present the procedures and results of the tests we have conducted as 
well as pointing to the potential impact the vulnerabilities that were found may have.  
Test scenario 1: Message integrity, confidentiality and authentication 
Protecting the integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of messages is particularly 
important for health care information systems, both due to privacy concerns and risk of 
incorrect treatment. However, using a network sniffer to look at the SOAP 
request/response messages sent between a client application and the MPOWER web 
services, we saw SOAP messages such as those depicted in Figure 3. These clearly 
show that no cryptographic protection is currently implemented. Adversaries may 
therefore edit messages at will, without fear of being detected by the system. Entity 
authentication is done solely through a login procedure, where the user provides a 
username and password to prove her identity. The login procedure is performed only 
once per session, and any subsequent proofs of identity are implicit by providing a 
security token. Although password-based authentication is both widely used and 
recognised, the lack of password confidentiality makes the process highly insecure. 
With passwords transmitted in clear text as shown in the figure, password sniffing is 
trivial. 
Test scenario 2: Replay attacks 
Replay attacks include situations where an adversary records and resends messages, 
possibly without knowing their contents. Thus, a message, e.g., containing a 
prescription for drugs, may be duplicated so that the patient receives more than what the 
original prescription said, or it could be as simple as to flood an electronic patient record 
with identical messages in order to hamper reading. Since messages do not carry any 
cryptographic protection nor sequence number or other data that conveys uniqueness, 
adversaries may replay any message or sequence of message in order to manipulate 
services or users. 
 
                                                 
4 Available from https://glassfish.dev.java.net/ (version 2.0) 
5 Available from http://www.wireshark.org/ (version 1.2) 
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We conducted a test where we repeatedly made the same request to add a new activity 
to a patient’s calendar. All repetitions were accepted, which makes the calendar entries 
difficult, not to say impossible, to read.  
Test scenario 3: Access rights elevation 
The security token returned during the login procedure, which was shown in Figure 1, 
contains a list of services and functions available to the user entitled “serviceIDs”. Our 
tests reveal that it is sufficient for a user to simply add services’ serviceID in order to 
gain access to them. Test input was generated through a normal login procedure and 
then a subsequent request to a service for which the user was not authorised. After 
manipulating the security token by adding the service’s serviceID, the request was 
retransmitted. While the service correctly denies access in the original request, the 
manipulated security token is accepted and access granted for the second request (see 
Figure 4). Although service ID’s are not published by services, it is easy to compute 
them as they normally are formed by concatenation of service and function name. 
 
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<S:Envelope>
<S:Body>
<ns2:authenticateUserPassResponse>
<return>
<message>Login succeeded!</message>
<boolValue>true</boolValue>
<securityToken>
<userID>16</userID>
<sessionID>caRSU7cJa7XgQAB/AQFxmQ==</sessionID>
<primaryRoleName>HealthProfessional</primaryRoleName>
<authenticationTime>2009-08-21T11:16:21.670</authenticationTime>
<serviceIDs>CalendarManagement__rejectActivity_A</serviceIDs>
</securityToken>
<status>
<messageId>0</messageId>
<result>0</result>
<errorCause>Login succeeded!</errorCause>
<timestamp>0</timestamp>
</status>
</return>
</ns2:authenticateUserPassResponse>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<S:Envelope>
<S:Body>
<ns2:authenticateUserPass>
<username>Anna.Nowacka</username>
<password>1234</password>
</ns2:authenticateUserPass>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
 
Figure 3: SOAP messages for authentication (request in the top right corner) 
Our testing revealed that any field in the securityToken may be changed, without 
affecting access control, except the user ID. Through code inspection it is clear that the 
user ID is looked up in the database and if it exists, and the time since last 
authentication has not expired, the token is accepted. The values needed for this check 
are collected from the database, rather than the token. It therefore has no effect, e.g., to 
change the authentication time. 
 
Although perhaps not the most common of attacks, it is noted that the opposite is also 
possible; that is to reduce access rights by removing serviceIDs from a user’s token. 
Test scenario 4: Omitting procedures 
The MPOWER platform contains no mechanisms for authentication and authorisation 
of services requiring access to another service. In Figure 1 the authentication service 
calls a token management service, which in turn issues a security token for the user. The 
authentication service will only perform the call if the authentication process is 
successful. However, the token management service does not verify the authenticity of 
the request, i.e. that it originates from the authentication service. Thus, it is possible for 
a user to request a token directly from the token management service, thereby omitting 
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the entire authentication procedure. The only required input in order to successfully 
issue a token is a valid user ID, see Figure 5. Such background services would of course 
normally not be published in a directory service, but they are nevertheless accessible 
and therefore possible to contact. Furthermore, in this case user IDs are integer values 
that are created using auto-increment in the database. It should therefore not require 
many attempts in order to find a valid user, for which access rights can be manipulated 
afterwards. 
 
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<S:Envelope>
<S:Body>
<ns2:isAuthorized>
<token>
<userID>16</userID>
<sessionID>aGFsbG9kdWph</sessionID>
<primaryRoleName>HealthProfessional</primaryRoleName>
<authenticationTime>2009-08-21T11:16:21.670</authenticationTime>
<serviceIDs>MyOwnService__MyOwnMethod</serviceIDs>
</token>
<serviceID>MyOwnService</serviceID>
<methodName>MyOwnMethod</methodName>
</ns2:isAuthorized>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
<!--------------- Response ------------------>
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<S:Envelope>
<S:Body>
<ns2:isAuthorizedResponse>
<return>
<message>Access is granted.</message>
<boolValue>true</boolValue>
<status>
<messageId>0</messageId>
<result>0</result>
<errorCause>Access is granted.</errorCause>
<timestamp>0</timestamp>
</status>
</return>
</ns2:isAuthorizedResponse>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>                 
Figure 4: SOAP message showing a manipulated security token is accepted by the authorisation service 
With the four fundamental security flaws revealed in the above sections, any additional 
security testing serves no purpose. It is hard to imagine other vulnerabilities that would 
be easier to exploit or provide more functionality, and we therefore concentrate on these 
when we discuss possible solutions. 
 
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<S:Envelope>
<S:Body>
<ns2:IssueTokenResponse >
<return>
<token>
<userID>16</userID>
<sessionID>cZAwxVvrOJPgQAB/AQEjlQ==</sessionID>
<authenticationTime>2009-08-20T11:15:19.356</authenticationTime>
</token>
<status>
<messageId>0</messageId>
<result>0</result>
<errorCause>Successful operation.</errorCause>
<timestamp>0</timestamp>
</status>
</return>
</ns2:IssueTokenResponse>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<S:Envelope >
<S:Body>
<ns2:IssueToken >
<userid>16</userid>
</ns2:IssueToken>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
 
Figure 5: SOAP message for issuing a token (request is in the top right corner) 
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4. Discussion  
In the section about security challenges related to the use of SOA we listed four key 
challenges, where one of them are related to publicly accessible business logic, and the 
verbose information that can be obtained by studying a services WSDL file. Our limited 
tests can be used to illustrate three related misuse scenarios. A) The issued security 
tokens contain a reference to all the services and operations a specific user has 
authorisation to use (see Figure 4), as illustrated in test scenario 3. Since WSDL files 
are publicly accessible, an attacker can easily collect information about all available 
services and operations and thereby modify the token to obtain full access to the entire 
service platform. A simple script scanning WSDL files and modifying the security 
token is everything an attacker needs to perform this task. B) The WSDL file of the 
Token Management service revealed that this service had an operation called 
issueToken with userID as input parameter (test scenario 4). Consequently, it was easy 
to generate a script calling this service’s operation with an arbitrary user ID. Even 
though this feature was only intended to be used via the authentication service, the 
service responded to direct calls from a tailored client. The fact that the service’s WSDL 
file was published made the attack easier. C) Even non-existing information in the 
WSDL file can be used by attackers. In our case the configuration files actually reveal 
that WS-Security is not enabled at all, as there are no signs of a WS-Security header at 
all in the WSDL specification. 
 
One can argue that all of these attacks are trivial, and that they could never have been 
exploited if the security functionality had been successfully implemented. Security by 
obscurity is not a good design choice, meaning that WSDL verbosity in itself should not 
be a problem. However, that does not change the fact that the more information an 
attacker can obtain, the easier it is for him to find the weak spots of a system. These 
findings confirm the concerns expressed by Younus and Mallal [24] and Vorobiev and 
Han [23]. 
 
A second challenge was related to the problem of Identity Management. In the 
MPOWER platform the concept of security tokens are introduced to identify the user 
who initiates service requests and thereby to be able to make access control decisions 
based on that. The MPOWER solution is inspired by the SAML security standard [15], 
yet the implementation illustrates several challenges related to managing identities. Test 
scenario 1 shows the importance of protecting confidentiality of user credentials to 
provide identity theft, and together with test scenario 3 we see that without proper 
protection, users can manipulate their digital identities to elevate their privileges. The 
latter scenario would have been avoided if the security token had been properly integrity 
protected, e.g., by digitally signing the entire token. Yet, test scenario 2 reveals another 
problem. Adversaries are able to replay messages into the system, meaning that they can 
record valid messages including security tokens and feed them into the system to obtain 
information at a later time. Even if the token was integrity protected a malign user could 
record it from one message and paste it (including the signature) into a crafted message 
to obtain access. A possible solution to this would be to protect the integrity of the 
entire message, including the token so that messages without a valid signature would be 
rejected by the service platform. This illustrates the complexity of building secure SOA-
based systems with single-sign-on functionality. 
 
Our test results do not give indications related to the challenges of obtaining full end-to-
end security or problems with network firewall traversals.  
The Norwegian Information Security Conference (NISK) 2009 193
 
The MPOWER middleware platform is only at the prototype stage and therefore by no 
means operative and fully functional. However, for illustrating common web service 
vulnerabilities and the challenges emerging from making the shift from monolithic 
applications to service oriented architecture, the prototype implementation is ideal.  
 
Now that the test scenarios are used to illustrate security challenges in SOA 
environments, we will look at how the implementation could be improved. 
  
Test scenario 1 - Integrity, confidentiality and authentication: Integrity protection or 
authentication can be provided through a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and XML-
based signatures [10].  Also, the WS-Security standard specifies how such XML-based 
signatures can be included in SOAP messages for web services. Similarly, XML-
encryption [9] can be utilised to encrypt messages or parts of messages between web 
services. The fundamental problem of these approaches is that they either require the 
deployment of a PKI or that every communicating party holds pre-shared keys, to allow 
secure hash functions to be used for message integration. History has shown that 
establishing and using certificate infrastructures is not trivial. The XKMS specification 
[20], however, aims at simplifying this task.  
 
Test scenario 2 - Message replay attacks: Perhaps one of the main challenges is to 
prevent replay attacks (record and resend) so that adversaries are unable to repeat 
requests. There are several available mechanisms to mitigate the risk of such attacks, 
including: A) Require that all messages carry timestamps, so that messages become 
invalid after a short period of time. B) Require that all messages carry a counter or 
sequence number that is strictly increasing, so that messages with equal or lower 
counter value than the last recorded will be discarded. C) Implement a challenge-
response protocol, so that users must prove ownership of a credential for all requests.  
 
While these mechanisms all protect from replay attacks, there are several practical 
problems in using them. Timestamps require clock synchronisation between all 
communicating parties, which is not trivial when the amount of users and organisations 
increase. Additionally, clock synchronisation must also be secured to prevent 
adversaries from manipulating the time in order to gain access. The counter mechanism 
is relatively simple, but requires that services (security services) store the latest counter 
value for all users. Additionally, user clients must be aware of their counter as well, 
which might be problematic for portable usage (mobile clients, web clients, etc). So 
scalability is an issue for this mechanism. The challenge-response mechanism is widely 
used and proven in many secure communication protocols (e.g., SSL/TLS). Users and 
services verify the authenticity of the other party using randomly generated challenges. 
Replayed messages will therefore not be accepted, since the contained challenge will 
not match. The problem with this approach is that it requires additional messages to be 
passed between communicating parties and hence may introduce considerable overhead 
in terms of time and bandwidth consumption.  
 
Test scenario 3 – Access rights elevation: As already mentioned, the problem of 
elevating privileges by modifying the security token could have been eliminated if, e.g., 
XML-signature [10] had been used for integrity protection of tokens and the messages 
they are included in. This presupposes that the signature is properly validated when 
signed messages are received. 
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Test scenario 4 - Omitting procedures: This problem stems from the fact that normal 
internal messaging has become public through the use of Web Services. That is, 
interaction between services in order to fulfil a given task (e.g., login) may be denoted 
internal communication, but with the advent of web services, this kind of 
communication is as public as any other. Hence, in order to ensure that procedures are 
followed, access to secondary (i.e. underlying) services must be restricted to include 
only those parts of a valid procedure. Again, Public Key Infrastructures or shared secret 
keys may be used. 
 
Building secure software systems is complex and as indicated in this paper, service 
orientation and distribution of services adds to the complexity. McGraw [28] and 
Apvrille and Pourzandi [29], among others, suggest keeping a security focus throughout 
the entire software development lifecycle. Our results illustrate the importance of their 
message. Even though this paper does not discuss where and why the errors were 
introduced, we see that the final security assessment reveal weaknesses that can be 
removed in the next prototype. 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper we have given a brief overview of the available standards for securing web 
services, and outlined some of the challenges faced when implementing secure service 
oriented software systems. We have exemplified some of these challenges through grey-
box testing of a prototype implementation of SOA-based home care system. Our 
examples illustrate the complexity of building secure web service systems and highlight 
the importance of integrating security in the entire software development lifecycle.  
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Appendix B
Secondary Papers
SP1:
Jostein Jensen, Inger Anne Tøndel, Martin Gilje Jaatun, Per Håkon Meland, and Herb-
jørn Andresen, "Reusable Security Requirements for Healthcare Applications". Fourth
International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES ’2009), 2009
Abstract:
Healthcare information systems are currently being migrated from paper based journals to
fully digitalised information platforms. Protecting patient privacy is thus becoming an in-
creasingly complex task, where several national and international legal requirements must
be met. These legal requirements present only high-level goals for privacy protection,
leaving the details of security requirements engineering to the developers of electronic
healthcare systems. Our objective has been to map legal requirements for sensitive per-
sonal information to a set of reusable technical information security requirements. This
paper presents examples of such requirements extracted from legislation applicable to the
healthcare domain.
SP2:
Richard Sassoon, Martin Gilje Jaatun, Jostein Jensen, "The Road to Hell is Paved with
Good Intentions: A Story of (In)secure Software Development" Fifth International Con-
ference on Availability, Reliability, and Security (ARES ’10), 2010.
Abstract:
Model driven development (MDD) is considered a promising approach for software de-
velopment. In this paper the results of a systematic survey is reported to identify the
state-of-the-art within the topic of security in model driven development, with a special
focus on ﬁnding empirical studies. We provide an introduction to the major secure MDD
initiatives, but our survey shows that there is a lack of empirical work on the topic. We
conclude that better standardisation initiatives and more empirical research in the ﬁeld is
necessary before it can be considered mature.
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